Kanban Lite MCP Server
kanban-lite
npm
v1.2.22
Published by borgius — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Kanban board manager - VSCode extension, CLI, MCP server, and standalone web app
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 18
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:11261`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/extension.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/extension.js:5974`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/extension.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/mcp-server.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp-server.js:5974`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp-server.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/sdk/index.cjs)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/sdk/index.cjs:5974`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/sdk/index.cjs
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/sdk/index.mjs)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/sdk/index.mjs:5979`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/sdk/index.mjs
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/standalone-webview/jsonforms-vendor-Dc94wgf1.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/standalone-webview/jsonforms-vendor-Dc94wgf1.js:5`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e.process(u,e));const g=new Function(`${ct.default.self}`,`${ct.default.scope}`,u)(this,this.scope.get());if(this.scope.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/standalone-webview/jsonforms-vendor-Dc94wgf1.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/standalone.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/standalone.js:9683`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const makeValidate = new Function(`${names_1.default.self}`, `${names_1.default.scope}`, sourceCode); const v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/standalone.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:27803`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: = __toESM(require("node:child_process")); init_types2(); init_plugins2(); PLUGIN_SETTINGS_REDACTION_TARGETS
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/extension.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/extension.js:32187`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: = __toESM(require("node:child_process")); var PLUGIN_SETTINGS_REDACTION_TARGETS = ["read", "list", "error"]; var DEFAULT
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/extension.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp-server.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp-server.js:28532`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: = __toESM(require("node:child_process")); var PLUGIN_SETTINGS_REDACTION_TARGETS = ["read", "list", "error"]; var DEFAULT
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp-server.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/sdk/index.cjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/sdk/index.cjs:28589`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: = __toESM(require("node:child_process")); var PLUGIN_SETTINGS_REDACTION_TARGETS = ["read", "list", "error"]; var DEFAULT
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/sdk/index.cjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/sdk/index.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/sdk/index.mjs:28487`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: childProcess from "node:child_process"; var PLUGIN_SETTINGS_REDACTION_TARGETS = ["read", "list", "error"]; var DEFAULT_P
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/sdk/index.mjs
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/standalone.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/standalone.js:21354`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e_process3, import_node_child_process, execFileAsync; var init_default_browser_id = __esm({ "../../node_modules/.pnpm/
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/standalone.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/sdk/plugin-settings.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/sdk/plugin-settings.ts:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: childProcess from 'node:child_process' import type { PluginSettingsErrorPayload, PluginSettingsInstallRequest, Plu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/sdk/plugin-settings.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (e2e/fixture.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`e2e/fixture.ts:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: essByStdio } from 'node:child_process' import type { Readable } from 'node:stream' import { test as base, expect } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server e2e/fixture.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/cli/index.test.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/cli/index.test.ts:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process' import type { ExecFileException } from 'node:child_process' import { promisify }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli/index.test.ts
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (src/worker/cloudflare-resources-script.test.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/worker/cloudflare-resources-script.test.ts:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: n(), })) vi.mock('node:child_process', () => ({ spawnSync: spawnSyncMock, })) const __filename = fileURLToPath(impor
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/worker/cloudflare-resources-script.test.ts
low Dynamic module load from a non-literal in packaging/dev tooling (src/worker/deploy-cloudflare-worker-script.test.ts)MTC-SRC-005
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`src/worker/deploy-cloudflare-worker-script.test.ts:63`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ise<void> }> { return import(deployScriptPath) } function createTempDir(): string { const tempDir = fs.mkdtempSync(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/worker/deploy-cloudflare-worker-script.test.ts
Tools 52
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
trigger_board_actionnetwork egressadd_attachmentno sensitive capabilityadd_board_actionno sensitive capabilityadd_board_logno sensitive capabilityadd_columnno sensitive capabilityadd_commentno sensitive capabilityadd_logno sensitive capabilitycleanup_columnno sensitive capabilityclear_board_logsno sensitive capabilityclear_logsno sensitive capability
Show 42 more tools ↓
create_boardno sensitive capabilitycreate_cardno sensitive capabilitydelete_boardno sensitive capabilitydelete_cardno sensitive capabilitydelete_commentno sensitive capabilitydelete_labelno sensitive capabilityget_active_cardno sensitive capabilityget_auth_statusno sensitive capabilityget_boardno sensitive capabilityget_cardno sensitive capabilityget_settingsno sensitive capabilityget_storage_statusno sensitive capabilityget_workspace_infono sensitive capabilitylist_attachmentsno sensitive capabilitylist_available_eventsno sensitive capabilitylist_board_actionsno sensitive capabilitylist_board_logsno sensitive capabilitylist_boardsno sensitive capabilitylist_cardsno sensitive capabilitylist_columnsno sensitive capabilitylist_commentsno sensitive capabilitylist_labelsno sensitive capabilitylist_logsno sensitive capabilitymigrate_to_markdownno sensitive capabilitymigrate_to_sqliteno sensitive capabilitymove_cardno sensitive capabilitypermanent_delete_cardno sensitive capabilityremove_attachmentno sensitive capabilityremove_board_actionno sensitive capabilityremove_columnno sensitive capabilityrename_labelno sensitive capabilityreorder_columnsno sensitive capabilityset_labelno sensitive capabilityset_minimized_columnsno sensitive capabilitystream_commentno sensitive capabilitysubmit_card_formno sensitive capabilitytransfer_cardno sensitive capabilitytrigger_actionno sensitive capabilityupdate_cardno sensitive capabilityupdate_columnno sensitive capabilityupdate_commentno sensitive capabilityupdate_settingsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (52 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.2.22 latest |
A 93/100 | 18 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan kanban-lite --onlineMore in Productivity & Workflow
MCP AgentChat - 让 AI Agent 通过 Telegram 与用户实时交互：发送消息、图片，等待用户回复
A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Airthings Air Quality Monitor devices.
MCP server for Anki
TypeScript package for reading and searching Apple Notes on macOS via direct SQLite access. Includes markdown conversion, attachment support, and offers a local MCP server!
Verified biotech catalyst calendar (PDUFA/AdComm/trial readouts) anchored to official sources.
Appointment booking platform letting agents check provider availability and create bookings.