Kalshi (cejor6) MCP Server
kalshi-mcp-server
PyPI
v0.3.3
Published by cejor6 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Model Context Protocol server for Kalshi prediction markets — native RSA-PSS auth, token-bucket rate limiting, demo/prod safety controls.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/kalshi_mcp_server/tools/external_data.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/kalshi_mcp_server/tools/external_data.py:23`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: lse`` so env proxies / ``.netrc`` can never inject routing or auth either. - **Redirects are NOT followed.** A 3xx wit
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/kalshi_mcp_server/tools/external_data.py
Tools 40
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
kalshi_fetch_external_dataingests untrusted inputkalshi_get_environmentreads sensitive datakalshi_get_orderingests untrusted inputkalshi_get_seriesingests untrusted inputkalshi_cancel_orderno sensitive capabilitykalshi_confirm_orderno sensitive capabilitykalshi_create_combo_marketno sensitive capabilitykalshi_decrease_orderno sensitive capabilitykalshi_find_liquid_marketsno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_api_limitsno sensitive capability
Show 30 more tools ↓
kalshi_get_balanceno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_batch_candlesticksno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_combo_collectionno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_combo_collectionsno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_combo_eventsno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_combo_legsno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_eventno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_event_candlesticksno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_event_forecast_historyno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_eventsno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_exchange_scheduleno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_exchange_statusno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_fillsno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_live_orderbookno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_marketno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_market_candlesticksno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_market_tradesno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_marketsno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_milestonesno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_orderbookno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_orderbooksno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_ordersno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_positionsno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_series_listno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_series_summaryno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_settlementsno sensitive capabilitykalshi_get_tradesno sensitive capabilitykalshi_prepare_orderno sensitive capabilitykalshi_sample_tradesno sensitive capabilitykalshi_set_safety_limitsno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (40 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 6
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.3 latest |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
v0.3.2 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-17 |
v0.3.1 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-15 |
v0.2.0 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-10 |
v0.1.13 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-09 |
Show 1 more version ↓
v0.1.12 |
A 96/100 | 1 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan kalshi-mcp-server --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Kalshi 6
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 7 side by side →
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