Kairo (sandeepbollavaram) MCP Server
kairo-mcp
npm
v1.6.0
Published by sandeepbollavaram — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Tool "kairo_record" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "kairo_record" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool kairo_record
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/commands.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/commands.js:12`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { KairoClient } from '../sdk/index.js'; import { kairoPaths } from '../st
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/commands.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/initSpec.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/initSpec.js:32`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: spawnSync } from 'node:child_process'; import { join } from 'node:path'; /** * Pure function. Same input → same output
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/initSpec.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/core/github/gitContext.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/core/github/gitContext.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import { promisify } from 'node:util'; import { logger } from '../../utils/logge
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/core/github/gitContext.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "kairo_record"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "kairo_record" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool kairo_record · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "kairo_record" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "kairo_record" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool kairo_record
Tools 42
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
kairo_recordruns code / shellkairo_analytics_summaryno sensitive capabilitykairo_assessno sensitive capabilitykairo_benchmarkno sensitive capabilitykairo_briefno sensitive capabilitykairo_capsule_createno sensitive capabilitykairo_changelogno sensitive capabilitykairo_checkpointno sensitive capabilitykairo_checkpoint_lineageno sensitive capabilitykairo_commit_messageno sensitive capability
Show 32 more tools ↓
kairo_compact_memoryno sensitive capabilitykairo_conflict_historyno sensitive capabilitykairo_continuationno sensitive capabilitykairo_coordination_statusno sensitive capabilitykairo_git_statusno sensitive capabilitykairo_graphno sensitive capabilitykairo_heartbeatno sensitive capabilitykairo_index_statusno sensitive capabilitykairo_leaseno sensitive capabilitykairo_memory_digestno sensitive capabilitykairo_memory_indexno sensitive capabilitykairo_memory_refreshno sensitive capabilitykairo_memory_searchno sensitive capabilitykairo_module_activityno sensitive capabilitykairo_perf_reportno sensitive capabilitykairo_plugins_listno sensitive capabilitykairo_query_eventsno sensitive capabilitykairo_release_planno sensitive capabilitykairo_repo_intelno sensitive capabilitykairo_repo_scanno sensitive capabilitykairo_retrieval_traceno sensitive capabilitykairo_risk_reportno sensitive capabilitykairo_session_endno sensitive capabilitykairo_session_startno sensitive capabilitykairo_session_statusno sensitive capabilitykairo_snapshot_exportno sensitive capabilitykairo_snapshot_importno sensitive capabilitykairo_stability_ofno sensitive capabilitykairo_team_activityno sensitive capabilitykairo_telemetry_statusno sensitive capabilitykairo_timelineno sensitive capabilitykairo_timeline_queryno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (42 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.6.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan kairo-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Kairo 1
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