Kabuzz MCP Server

@kabuzz/mcp-server npm v0.1.0

Published by @kabuzz — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server for the Kabuzz AI-native resale marketplace. Enables any MCP-compatible AI agent to list, browse, negotiate, purchase, and message on Kabuzz.

Trust grade
A
96/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 96/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 96/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−3 capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([search_listings, get_thread_messages, get_unread_count]) co-exist with external-action tools ([send_message]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [search_listings, get_thread_messages, get_unread_count] → sinks [send_message]

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow search_listings → send_message

Tools 49

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • get_thread_messagesingests untrusted input
  • get_unread_countingests untrusted input
  • search_listingsingests untrusted input
  • send_messagenetwork egress
  • accept_offerno sensitive capability
  • archive_listingno sensitive capability
  • cancel_orderno sensitive capability
  • check_onboarding_statusno sensitive capability
  • confirm_deliveryno sensitive capability
  • confirm_local_pickupno sensitive capability
Show 39 more tools ↓
  • confirm_payment_methodno sensitive capability
  • counter_offerno sensitive capability
  • create_listingno sensitive capability
  • create_setup_intentno sensitive capability
  • estimate_feesno sensitive capability
  • get_active_offerno sensitive capability
  • get_buyer_offersno sensitive capability
  • get_categoriesno sensitive capability
  • get_listingno sensitive capability
  • get_my_listing_detailno sensitive capability
  • get_my_listingsno sensitive capability
  • get_offerno sensitive capability
  • get_order_detailno sensitive capability
  • get_order_eventsno sensitive capability
  • get_order_shippingno sensitive capability
  • get_order_shipping_ratesno sensitive capability
  • get_ordersno sensitive capability
  • get_photo_upload_urlsno sensitive capability
  • get_seller_offersno sensitive capability
  • get_shipping_estimateno sensitive capability
  • get_spending_summaryno sensitive capability
  • get_threadsno sensitive capability
  • get_watched_listingsno sensitive capability
  • initiate_onboardingno sensitive capability
  • is_watchingno sensitive capability
  • list_payment_methodsno sensitive capability
  • make_offerno sensitive capability
  • mark_order_shippedno sensitive capability
  • purchase_listingno sensitive capability
  • purchase_shipping_labelno sensitive capability
  • record_manual_shipmentno sensitive capability
  • reject_offerno sensitive capability
  • remove_payment_methodno sensitive capability
  • reply_to_threadno sensitive capability
  • set_default_payment_methodno sensitive capability
  • unwatch_listingno sensitive capability
  • update_listingno sensitive capability
  • watch_listingno sensitive capability
  • withdraw_offerno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v0.1.0 latest A 96/100 1 1.13.0 2026-09-07

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 96/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @kabuzz/mcp-server --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

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