Tmux (k8ika0s) MCP Server
@k8ika0s/mcp-tmux
npm
v0.1.10
Published by @k8ika0s — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Model Context Protocol server that lets LLMs collaboratively drive tmux
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 15
high Tool "tmux_open_session" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "tmux_open_session" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool tmux_open_session
high Tool "tmux_run_batch" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "tmux_run_batch" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool tmux_run_batch
high Tool "tmux_new_session" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "tmux_new_session" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool tmux_new_session
high Tool "tmux_new_window" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "tmux_new_window" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool tmux_new_window
high Tool "tmux_split_pane" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "tmux_split_pane" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool tmux_split_pane
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "tmux_open_session"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "tmux_open_session" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool tmux_open_session · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "tmux_run_batch"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "tmux_run_batch" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool tmux_run_batch · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "tmux_new_session"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "tmux_new_session" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool tmux_new_session · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "tmux_new_window"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "tmux_new_window" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool tmux_new_window · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "tmux_split_pane"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "tmux_split_pane" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool tmux_split_pane · inputSchema.properties.command
low Mutating tool "tmux_open_session" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "tmux_open_session" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool tmux_open_session
low Mutating tool "tmux_run_batch" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "tmux_run_batch" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool tmux_run_batch
low Mutating tool "tmux_new_session" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "tmux_new_session" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool tmux_new_session
low Mutating tool "tmux_new_window" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "tmux_new_window" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool tmux_new_window
low Mutating tool "tmux_split_pane" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "tmux_split_pane" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool tmux_split_pane
Tools 37
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
tmux_new_sessionruns code / shelltmux_new_windowruns code / shelltmux_open_sessionruns code / shelltmux_run_batchruns code / shelltmux_split_paneruns code / shelltmux_apply_layout_profileno sensitive capabilitytmux_batch_captureno sensitive capabilitytmux_capture_layoutno sensitive capabilitytmux_capture_paneno sensitive capabilitytmux_commandno sensitive capability
Show 27 more tools ↓
tmux_context_historyno sensitive capabilitytmux_debug_rawno sensitive capabilitytmux_default_contextno sensitive capabilitytmux_get_defaultno sensitive capabilitytmux_healthno sensitive capabilitytmux_kill_paneno sensitive capabilitytmux_kill_sessionno sensitive capabilitytmux_kill_windowno sensitive capabilitytmux_list_panesno sensitive capabilitytmux_list_sessionsno sensitive capabilitytmux_list_windowsno sensitive capabilitytmux_multi_runno sensitive capabilitytmux_quickstartno sensitive capabilitytmux_readonly_stateno sensitive capabilitytmux_rename_sessionno sensitive capabilitytmux_rename_windowno sensitive capabilitytmux_restore_layoutno sensitive capabilitytmux_save_layout_profileno sensitive capabilitytmux_select_paneno sensitive capabilitytmux_select_windowno sensitive capabilitytmux_send_keysno sensitive capabilitytmux_server_infono sensitive capabilitytmux_set_audit_loggingno sensitive capabilitytmux_set_defaultno sensitive capabilitytmux_set_sync_panesno sensitive capabilitytmux_stateno sensitive capabilitytmux_tail_paneno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (37 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.10 latest |
A 93/100 | 15 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @k8ika0s/mcp-tmux --onlineOther implementations of Tmux 5
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 6 side by side →
MCP server for controlling tmux sessions
A simplified and elegant MCP server for persistent shell execution via tmux.
MCP server for local tmux session management
A comprehensive, universal MCP server for driving tmux (local and over SSH).
MCP Server for interfacing with tmux sessions
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