Exec — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@justanothermldude/mcp-exec",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@justanothermldude/mcp-exec"
},
"server": {
"name": "@justanothermldude/mcp-exec"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 86,
"threatScore": 94,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 6.3,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (3 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"execute_code_with_wrappers\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"execute_code_with_wrappers\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword \"execute code\" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "execute_code_with_wrappers"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/bridge/port-cleanup.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/bridge/port-cleanup.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/bridge/port-cleanup.js"
},
"evidence": "port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { isOrphanedProcess } from '@justanothermldude/mcp-exec-core'; /** * Che",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/bridge/port-cleanup.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:976`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/index.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import { writeFile, unlink, mkdir } from \"node:fs/promises\"; import { join as jo",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/index.js",
"line": 976,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/sandbox/executor.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/sandbox/executor.js:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/sandbox/executor.js"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { writeFile, unlink, mkdir } from 'node:fs/promises'; import { join } fro",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/sandbox/executor.js",
"line": 6,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/bridge/port-cleanup.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/bridge/port-cleanup.js:12`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/bridge/port-cleanup.js"
},
"evidence": "const cmdline = execSync(`ps -p ${pid} -o command=`, { encoding: 'utf8' }).trim(); return cmdline.includ",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/bridge/port-cleanup.js",
"line": 12,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"code\" on \"execute_code_with_wrappers\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"execute_code_with_wrappers\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"code\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "execute_code_with_wrappers",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.code"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "code"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"execute_code_with_wrappers\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"execute_code_with_wrappers\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "execute_code_with_wrappers"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
"title": "Package has no license",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"@justanothermldude/mcp-exec\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@justanothermldude/mcp-exec"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"@justanothermldude/mcp-exec\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@justanothermldude/mcp-exec"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_available_mcp_servers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_mcp_tool_schema",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "execute_code_with_wrappers",
"tags": [
"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
"code-exec": [
"keyword \"execute code\" in tool name"
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "b5f3d8645e1e89c992c5af6cfe471392e9661a5bde689f35e547042cddb3c152",
"stats": {
"tools": 3,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 4,
"medium": 2,
"low": 1,
"info": 2
}
}
}