Just Jelly MCP Server
@just-jelly/mcp-server
npm
v2.2.6
Published by @just-jelly — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server giving AI agents real fhEVM tools — deploy contracts, encrypt values, check ACL, run tests, decode errors
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/exec.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/exec.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: xec, spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; const execAsync = promisify(nodeExec); /*
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/exec.js
Tools 32
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
check_acl_permissionno sensitive capabilitycheck_dependenciesno sensitive capabilitycheck_wallet_balanceno sensitive capabilitycompile_solidityno sensitive capabilitydecode_fhevm_errorno sensitive capabilitydeploy_contractno sensitive capabilityencrypt_multiple_valuesno sensitive capabilityencrypt_valueno sensitive capabilityestimate_fhe_gasno sensitive capabilityexplain_acl_patternno sensitive capability
Show 22 more tools ↓
explain_coprocessorno sensitive capabilityexplain_erc7984no sensitive capabilityexplain_fhe_typeno sensitive capabilitygenerate_confidential_contractno sensitive capabilitygenerate_fhevm_testno sensitive capabilitygenerate_frontend_dappno sensitive capabilitygenerate_hardhat_configno sensitive capabilitygenerate_vite_configno sensitive capabilityget_confidential_wrapper_codeno sensitive capabilityget_encrypted_balanceno sensitive capabilityget_faucet_linksno sensitive capabilityget_fhevm_tutorialno sensitive capabilityget_network_configno sensitive capabilityget_protocol_addressesno sensitive capabilitylist_toolsno sensitive capabilityread_contract_stateno sensitive capabilityrun_hardhat_testsno sensitive capabilityscaffold_fhevm_projectno sensitive capabilitysetup_mcp_configno sensitive capabilityverify_fhevm_contractno sensitive capabilityverify_on_etherscanno sensitive capabilitywatch_decryption_callbackno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (32 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.2.6 latest |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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