Hetzner (jurislm) MCP Server
@jurislm/hetzner-mcp
npm
v1.5.0
Published by @jurislm — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for managing Hetzner Cloud infrastructure
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/server-ssh.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/server-ssh.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execFile } from "child_process"; import { mkdtempSync, writeFileSync, rmSync } from "fs"; import { tmpdir } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/server-ssh.js
Tools 42
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
hetzner_assert_storage_box_spaceno sensitive capabilityhetzner_attach_volumeno sensitive capabilityhetzner_change_storage_box_protectionno sensitive capabilityhetzner_change_storage_box_typeno sensitive capabilityhetzner_create_serverno sensitive capabilityhetzner_create_ssh_keyno sensitive capabilityhetzner_create_storage_boxno sensitive capabilityhetzner_create_storage_box_snapshotno sensitive capabilityhetzner_create_storage_box_subaccountno sensitive capabilityhetzner_delete_serverno sensitive capability
Show 32 more tools ↓
hetzner_delete_ssh_keyno sensitive capabilityhetzner_delete_storage_boxno sensitive capabilityhetzner_delete_storage_box_snapshotno sensitive capabilityhetzner_delete_storage_box_subaccountno sensitive capabilityhetzner_detach_volumeno sensitive capabilityhetzner_disable_storage_box_snapshot_planno sensitive capabilityhetzner_enable_storage_box_snapshot_planno sensitive capabilityhetzner_get_serverno sensitive capabilityhetzner_get_server_metricsno sensitive capabilityhetzner_get_server_ramno sensitive capabilityhetzner_get_ssh_keyno sensitive capabilityhetzner_get_storage_boxno sensitive capabilityhetzner_get_storage_box_statsno sensitive capabilityhetzner_get_volumeno sensitive capabilityhetzner_list_imagesno sensitive capabilityhetzner_list_locationsno sensitive capabilityhetzner_list_server_typesno sensitive capabilityhetzner_list_serversno sensitive capabilityhetzner_list_ssh_keysno sensitive capabilityhetzner_list_storage_box_foldersno sensitive capabilityhetzner_list_storage_box_snapshotsno sensitive capabilityhetzner_list_storage_box_subaccountsno sensitive capabilityhetzner_list_storage_boxesno sensitive capabilityhetzner_list_volumesno sensitive capabilityhetzner_power_off_serverno sensitive capabilityhetzner_power_on_serverno sensitive capabilityhetzner_reboot_serverno sensitive capabilityhetzner_reset_storage_box_passwordno sensitive capabilityhetzner_rollback_storage_box_snapshotno sensitive capabilityhetzner_update_storage_boxno sensitive capabilityhetzner_update_storage_box_access_settingsno sensitive capabilityhetzner_update_storage_box_subaccountno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (42 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.5.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @jurislm/hetzner-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Hetzner 4
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 5 side by side →
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