Jupyterlab Rtc MCP Server
jupyterlab-rtc-mcp
npm
v0.1.0
Published by longrun-ai — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Dynamic code execution in server code (bundle/jupyterlab-rtc-mcp.mjs)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`bundle/jupyterlab-rtc-mcp.mjs:6`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ee,E));var X;try{var de=new Function("self","RULES","formats","root","refVal","defaults","customRules","equal","ucs2leng
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bundle/jupyterlab-rtc-mcp.mjs
medium Tool "overwrite_document" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "overwrite_document" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "overwrite" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool overwrite_document
low Mutating tool "overwrite_document" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "overwrite_document" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool overwrite_document
Tools 28
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
overwrite_documentwrites filesassign_nb_kernelno sensitive capabilitycopy_documentno sensitive capabilitycreate_documentno sensitive capabilitycreate_notebookno sensitive capabilitydelete_documentno sensitive capabilitydelete_document_textno sensitive capabilitydelete_nb_cellsno sensitive capabilityend_document_sessionno sensitive capabilityend_nb_sessionno sensitive capability
Show 18 more tools ↓
execute_nb_cellsno sensitive capabilityget_base_urlno sensitive capabilityget_document_contentno sensitive capabilityget_document_infono sensitive capabilityget_nb_statno sensitive capabilityinsert_document_textno sensitive capabilityinsert_nb_cellsno sensitive capabilitylist_available_kernelsno sensitive capabilitylist_documentsno sensitive capabilitylist_nbsno sensitive capabilitymodify_nb_cellsno sensitive capabilitynb_path_from_urlno sensitive capabilityquery_document_sessionno sensitive capabilityquery_nb_sessionsno sensitive capabilityread_nb_cellsno sensitive capabilityrename_documentno sensitive capabilityreplace_document_textno sensitive capabilityrestart_nb_kernelno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (28 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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