Jsreverser MCP Server
jsreverser-mcp
npm
v2.0.5
Published by noone-hub — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for JavaScript reverse engineering and debugging
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 10
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (build/src/modules/collector/PageController.js)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`build/src/modules/collector/PageController.js:264`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: no-new-func new Function(script)(); }, scriptContent); logger.info('Preload script registere
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/modules/collector/PageController.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (build/src/modules/analyzer/CodeAnalyzer.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`build/src/modules/analyzer/CodeAnalyzer.js:886`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: tion: 'Critical: Use of eval() allows arbitrary code execution', recommendation: 'Refact
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/modules/analyzer/CodeAnalyzer.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (build/src/modules/collector/PageController.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`build/src/modules/collector/PageController.js:264`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: no-new-func new Function(script)(); }, scriptContent); logger.info('Preload script registere
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/modules/collector/PageController.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (build/src/modules/deobfuscator/JSVMPDeobfuscator.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`build/src/modules/deobfuscator/JSVMPDeobfuscator.js:398`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const arrayFunc = new Function(`return ${arrayContent || '[]'};`); const stringArray = arrayFu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/modules/deobfuscator/JSVMPDeobfuscator.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (build/src/modules/deobfuscator/PackerDeobfuscator.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`build/src/modules/deobfuscator/PackerDeobfuscator.js:99`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const parseFunc = new Function(`return [${argsString}];`); const params = parseFunc(); if
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/modules/deobfuscator/PackerDeobfuscator.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (build/src/modules/hook/HookTypeRegistry.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`build/src/modules/hook/HookTypeRegistry.js:750`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: description: 'Hook eval() and Function() constructor', apply(builder) { return builder.intercep
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/modules/hook/HookTypeRegistry.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (build/src/tools/debugger.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`build/src/tools/debugger.js:1226`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: === 'window' ? window : eval(objectPath); } catch(e) { throw new Error('Cannot find object: ' + objectPath); }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/tools/debugger.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (build/src/tools/rebuild.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`build/src/tools/rebuild.js:73`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: content) {', ' eval(capture.targetScript.content);', '}', '', 'const targetFunction = c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/tools/rebuild.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/src/modules/browser/BrowserModeManager.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/src/modules/browser/BrowserModeManager.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'fs'; import { logger } from '../../utils/logger.js';
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/modules/browser/BrowserModeManager.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/src/services/GeminiProvider.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/src/services/GeminiProvider.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: pawn, spawnSync } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'fs'; /** * Gemini provider implementation * Suppor
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/src/services/GeminiProvider.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.5 latest |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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