Obsidian Cli (joemugen) MCP Server
@joemugen/obsidian-cli-mcp
npm
v1.0.0-beta.1
Published by @joemugen — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for Obsidian CLI — semantic tools for vault management
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 7
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: obsidian_list_themes → obsidian_list_files → obsidian_eval. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow obsidian_list_themes → obsidian_list_files → obsidian_eval
high Tool "obsidian_execute_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "obsidian_execute_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "execute command" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool obsidian_execute_command
high Tool "obsidian_eval" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "obsidian_eval" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool obsidian_eval
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: n, execFileSync } from "child_process"; import os from "os"; var ObsidianCliService = class { constructor(obsidianBin,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "code" on "obsidian_eval"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "obsidian_eval" takes a command-shaped parameter "code" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool obsidian_eval · inputSchema.properties.code
low Mutating tool "obsidian_execute_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "obsidian_execute_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool obsidian_execute_command
low Mutating tool "obsidian_eval" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "obsidian_eval" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool obsidian_eval
Tools 78
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
obsidian_evalruns code / shellobsidian_execute_commandruns code / shellobsidian_list_filesreads sensitive dataobsidian_list_themesingests untrusted inputobsidian_sync_deletedreads sensitive dataobsidian_add_bookmarkno sensitive capabilityobsidian_append_dailyno sensitive capabilityobsidian_append_noteno sensitive capabilityobsidian_create_base_itemno sensitive capabilityobsidian_create_noteno sensitive capability
Show 68 more tools ↓
obsidian_daily_pathno sensitive capabilityobsidian_delete_noteno sensitive capabilityobsidian_diffno sensitive capabilityobsidian_disable_pluginno sensitive capabilityobsidian_disable_snippetno sensitive capabilityobsidian_enable_pluginno sensitive capabilityobsidian_enable_snippetno sensitive capabilityobsidian_file_infono sensitive capabilityobsidian_get_hotkeyno sensitive capabilityobsidian_get_pluginno sensitive capabilityobsidian_get_propertyno sensitive capabilityobsidian_get_tagno sensitive capabilityobsidian_get_themeno sensitive capabilityobsidian_history_listno sensitive capabilityobsidian_history_readno sensitive capabilityobsidian_history_restoreno sensitive capabilityobsidian_insert_templateno sensitive capabilityobsidian_install_pluginno sensitive capabilityobsidian_install_themeno sensitive capabilityobsidian_list_aliasesno sensitive capabilityobsidian_list_backlinksno sensitive capabilityobsidian_list_base_viewsno sensitive capabilityobsidian_list_basesno sensitive capabilityobsidian_list_bookmarksno sensitive capabilityobsidian_list_commandsno sensitive capabilityobsidian_list_deadendsno sensitive capabilityobsidian_list_foldersno sensitive capabilityobsidian_list_hotkeysno sensitive capabilityobsidian_list_linksno sensitive capabilityobsidian_list_orphansno sensitive capabilityobsidian_list_pluginsno sensitive capabilityobsidian_list_plugins_enabledno sensitive capabilityobsidian_list_propertiesno sensitive capabilityobsidian_list_recentsno sensitive capabilityobsidian_list_snippetsno sensitive capabilityobsidian_list_snippets_enabledno sensitive capabilityobsidian_list_tabsno sensitive capabilityobsidian_list_tagsno sensitive capabilityobsidian_list_tasksno sensitive capabilityobsidian_list_templatesno sensitive capabilityobsidian_list_unresolvedno sensitive capabilityobsidian_list_vaultsno sensitive capabilityobsidian_move_noteno sensitive capabilityobsidian_outlineno sensitive capabilityobsidian_prepend_dailyno sensitive capabilityobsidian_prepend_noteno sensitive capabilityobsidian_query_baseno sensitive capabilityobsidian_random_readno sensitive capabilityobsidian_read_dailyno sensitive capabilityobsidian_read_noteno sensitive capabilityobsidian_read_templateno sensitive capabilityobsidian_remove_propertyno sensitive capabilityobsidian_rename_noteno sensitive capabilityobsidian_searchno sensitive capabilityobsidian_search_contextno sensitive capabilityobsidian_set_propertyno sensitive capabilityobsidian_set_themeno sensitive capabilityobsidian_sync_historyno sensitive capabilityobsidian_sync_readno sensitive capabilityobsidian_sync_restoreno sensitive capabilityobsidian_sync_statusno sensitive capabilityobsidian_toggle_taskno sensitive capabilityobsidian_uninstall_pluginno sensitive capabilityobsidian_uninstall_themeno sensitive capabilityobsidian_vault_infono sensitive capabilityobsidian_versionno sensitive capabilityobsidian_wordcountno sensitive capabilityobsidian_workspaceno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (78 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0-beta.1 latest |
B 89/100 | 7 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @joemugen/obsidian-cli-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Obsidian Cli 3
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 4 side by side →
Save chat notes from Claude Desktop to your vault — MCP on Obsidian CLI. Keep what matters.
Cross-platform MCP server bridging MCP clients to the Obsidian Integrated CLI binary on macOS, Linux, and Windows hosts. Typed tools: append_note, backlinks, context_search, delete, files, find_and_replace, find_by_property, links, move, obsidian_exec, op
A [Model Context Protocol](https://modelcontextprotocol.io) server that wraps the [Obsidian CLI](https://help.obsidian.md/cli), allowing AI assistants like Claude to execute Obsidian CLI commands.
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