Jj MCP Server
jj-mcp-server
npm
v1.0.1
Published by keanemind — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for the Jujutsu (jj) version control system
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/index.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/index.ts:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/index.ts
Tools 55
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
file-listreads sensitive datagit-fetchingests untrusted inputabandonno sensitive capabilitybookmark-createno sensitive capabilitybookmark-deleteno sensitive capabilitybookmark-forgetno sensitive capabilitybookmark-listno sensitive capabilitybookmark-moveno sensitive capabilitybookmark-renameno sensitive capabilitybookmark-setno sensitive capability
Show 45 more tools ↓
bookmark-trackno sensitive capabilitybookmark-untrackno sensitive capabilitycommitno sensitive capabilityconfig-getno sensitive capabilityconfig-listno sensitive capabilityconfig-pathno sensitive capabilityconfig-setno sensitive capabilityconfig-unsetno sensitive capabilitydescribeno sensitive capabilitydiffno sensitive capabilityeditno sensitive capabilityevologno sensitive capabilityfile-annotateno sensitive capabilityfile-chmodno sensitive capabilityfile-showno sensitive capabilityfile-trackno sensitive capabilityfile-untrackno sensitive capabilitygit-cloneno sensitive capabilitygit-exportno sensitive capabilitygit-importno sensitive capabilitygit-pushno sensitive capabilitygit-remote-addno sensitive capabilitygit-remote-listno sensitive capabilitygit-remote-removeno sensitive capabilitygit-remote-renameno sensitive capabilitygit-remote-set-urlno sensitive capabilitygit-rootno sensitive capabilityinitno sensitive capabilityinterdiffno sensitive capabilitylogno sensitive capabilitynewno sensitive capabilityoperation-abandonno sensitive capabilityoperation-diffno sensitive capabilityoperation-logno sensitive capabilityoperation-restoreno sensitive capabilityoperation-showno sensitive capabilityoperation-undono sensitive capabilityrebaseno sensitive capabilityrestoreno sensitive capabilityrevertno sensitive capabilityshowno sensitive capabilitysquashno sensitive capabilitystatusno sensitive capabilitytag-listno sensitive capabilityworkspace-rootno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (55 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan jj-mcp-server --onlineMore in Productivity & Workflow
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