Jira Pilot MCP Server
jira-pilot
npm
v2.2.0
Source verified
Published by aarul5 — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
AI powered Jira CLI and MCP server for humans and agents — manage issues, sprints, boards with interactive wizards, multi-provider AI (OpenAI/Gemini/Anthropic), and an 14-tool MCP server for AI assistants
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 9.5 = 91. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −9.5 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×2 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 91 − 6 = 85. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/commands/ai-actions/review.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/commands/ai-actions/review.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { api } from '../../services/api-service.js'; import { aiService } from '
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/commands/ai-actions/review.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/commands/git.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/commands/git.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { api } from '../services/api-service.js'; import ora from '../utils/spin
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/commands/git.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/src/commands/issue-pr.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/commands/issue-pr.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { validateIssueKey } from '../utils/val
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/commands/issue-pr.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/commands/ai-actions/review.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/commands/ai-actions/review.ts:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { api } from '../../services/api-service.js'; import { aiService } from '
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/commands/ai-actions/review.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/commands/git.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/commands/git.ts:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from 'child_process'; import { api } from '../services/api-service.js'; import ora from '../utils/spin
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/commands/git.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/commands/issue-pr.ts)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/commands/issue-pr.ts:6`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ; import { exec } from 'child_process'; import { promisify } from 'util'; import { validateIssueKey } from '../utils/val
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/commands/issue-pr.ts
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/src/commands/git.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/src/commands/git.js:42`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: y { execSync(`git checkout -b ${branchName}`, { stdio: 'inherit' }); console.log
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/src/commands/git.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/commands/git.ts)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`src/commands/git.ts:46`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync(`git checkout -b ${branchName}`, { stdio: 'inherit' }); console
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/commands/git.ts
Tools 19
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
jira_create_issuenetwork egressAll Projectsno sensitive capabilityissueKeyno sensitive capabilityjira_add_attachmentno sensitive capabilityjira_add_commentno sensitive capabilityjira_add_worklogno sensitive capabilityjira_assign_issueno sensitive capabilityjira_create_subtaskno sensitive capabilityjira_get_issueno sensitive capabilityjira_list_issuesno sensitive capability
Show 9 more tools ↓
jira_list_projectsno sensitive capabilityjira_list_sprintsno sensitive capabilityjira_myselfno sensitive capabilityjira_search_usersno sensitive capabilityjira_transition_issueno sensitive capabilityjira_update_issueno sensitive capabilityjira-assistno sensitive capabilityjira-summarize-issueno sensitive capabilityMy Profileno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.2.0 latest |
B 85/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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