Iris (jenova-marie) MCP Server
@jenova-marie/iris-mcp
npm
v0.3.2
Published by @jenova-marie — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for cross-project Claude Code coordination - Bridge your AI agents across codebases
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([get_logs]) and tools that can send data out ([send_message]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [get_logs] → sinks [send_message]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow get_logs → send_message
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/actions/fork.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/actions/fork.js:18`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { existsSync } from "fs"; import { resolve } from "path"; import { getIri
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/actions/fork.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/agents/template-utils.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/agents/template-utils.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { access } from "fs/promises"; import { join } from "path"; import { home
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/agents/template-utils.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/process-pool/claude-process.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/process-pool/claude-process.js:216`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nfig) */ async spawn(spawnCacheEntry, spawnTimeout = 20000) { this.logger.info({ teamName:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/process-pool/claude-process.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/transport/local-transport.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/transport/local-transport.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { BehaviorSubject, Subject, firstValueFrom } from "rxjs"; import { filter
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/transport/local-transport.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/transport/ssh-transport.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/transport/ssh-transport.js:17`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { BehaviorSubject, Subject, firstValueFrom, filter, take, timeout, } from
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/transport/ssh-transport.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/claude-print.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/claude-print.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { getChildLogger } from "./logger.js"; import { TimeoutError } from "./er
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/claude-print.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/mcp-config-writer.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/mcp-config-writer.js:8`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { fileURLToPath } from "url"; import { dirname, join } from "path"; impor
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/utils/mcp-config-writer.js
Tools 20
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_logsreads sensitive datasend_messagenetwork egressask_messageno sensitive capabilityget_agentno sensitive capabilityget_dateno sensitive capabilityincludeGitDiffno sensitive capabilitylist_teamsno sensitive capabilitypermissions__approveno sensitive capabilityprojectPathno sensitive capabilityquick_messageno sensitive capability
Show 10 more tools ↓
session_cancelno sensitive capabilitysession_deleteno sensitive capabilitysession_forkno sensitive capabilitysession_rebootno sensitive capabilitysession_reportno sensitive capabilityteam_launchno sensitive capabilityteam_sleepno sensitive capabilityteam_statusno sensitive capabilityteam_wakeno sensitive capabilityteam_wake_allno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (20 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @jenova-marie/iris-mcp --onlineOther implementations of Iris 4
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 5 side by side →
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