Javaperf — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "javaperf",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "javaperf"
},
"server": {
"name": "javaperf"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 81,
"threatScore": 91,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 9.45,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "critical",
"label": "capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 10
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "critical",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"can execute shell commands or code",
"untrusted input can reach code execution"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (26 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/jdk.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/jdk.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/utils/jdk.js"
},
"evidence": "ync, spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import { existsSync } from \"node:fs\"; import { join } from \"node:path\"; let _jdk",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/utils/jdk.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (src/utils/jdk.ts)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/utils/jdk.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/utils/jdk.ts"
},
"evidence": "ync, spawn } from \"node:child_process\"; import { existsSync } from \"node:fs\"; import { join } from \"node:path\"; export",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "src/utils/jdk.ts",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/utils/jdk.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/jdk.js:41`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/utils/jdk.js"
},
"evidence": "const output = execSync(`\"${jpsPath}\" -l -m`, { encoding: \"utf-8\" }); return parseJpsOutput(output);",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/utils/jdk.js",
"line": 41,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (src/utils/jdk.ts)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/utils/jdk.ts:52`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/utils/jdk.ts"
},
"evidence": "s\"); const output = execSync(`\"${jpsPath}\" -l -m`, { encoding: \"utf-8\" }); return parseJpsOutput(output); } ca",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "src/utils/jdk.ts",
"line": 52,
"nonRuntime": false
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list_java_processes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "start_profiling",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "stop_profiling",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "check_deadlock",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"read_pr\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "list_jfr_recordings",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_threads",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"dump\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "heap_histogram",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "heap_live_histogram_diff",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"dump\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "heap_dump",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"dump\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "heap_info",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"dump\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "vm_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "trace_method",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "parse_jfr_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "profile_memory",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gc_efficiency",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "profile_time",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "profile_frequency",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "profile_jfr_network",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "profile_jfr_file_io",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "profile_jfr_locks",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "profile_jfr_native",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "native_memory_summary",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gc_class_stats",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "gc_finalizer_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compiler_codecache",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compiler_queue",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "96f4130a73385998d8ffc5520725e23d977b948d2286040a2d626d990e4f182f",
"stats": {
"tools": 26,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 2,
"medium": 2,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}