Hass — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@jarahkon/hass-mcp-server",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@jarahkon/hass-mcp-server"
},
"server": {
"name": "@jarahkon/hass-mcp-server"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 94,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "source",
"label": "publisher verification (provenance) — cryptographic build provenance ties the artifact to its source",
"appliedPenalty": 0
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can create, modify or delete files",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)"
],
"tags": [
"sensitive-source",
"external-sink",
"file-write"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (66 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-004",
"title": "Sensitive-source and external-sink co-exist",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tools that read sensitive data ([ha_list_files, ha_read_file]) and tools that can send data out ([ha_upload_file, ha_upload_file_content]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.",
"remediation": "Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "ha_list_files → ha_upload_file"
},
"evidence": "sources [ha_list_files, ha_read_file] → sinks [ha_upload_file, ha_upload_file_content]",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"sources": [
"ha_list_files",
"ha_read_file"
],
"sinks": [
"ha_upload_file",
"ha_upload_file_content"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-002",
"title": "Tool \"ha_delete_file\" can modify the filesystem",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"ha_delete_file\" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.",
"remediation": "Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ha_delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-006",
"title": "Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment in packaging/dev tooling (dist/__tests__/config.test.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/__tests__/config.test.js:111`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/__tests__/config.test.js"
},
"evidence": "yPath: \"/home/user/.ssh/id_rsa\", }; const result = requireSshConfig(config); expect(result.sshPr",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-006",
"file": "dist/__tests__/config.test.js",
"line": 111,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"ha_delete_file\" declares no destructiveHint",
"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ha_delete_file\" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.",
"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ha_delete_file"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"file-write"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"ha_list_files\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ha_list_files\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ha_list_files",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"ha_read_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ha_read_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ha_read_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-008",
"title": "Unconstrained path parameter \"path\" on \"ha_delete_file\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"ha_delete_file\" takes a path parameter \"path\" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.",
"remediation": "Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "ha_delete_file",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.path"
},
"data": {
"param": "path"
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [],
"sensitiveSource": [
"ha_list_files",
"ha_read_file"
],
"externalSink": [
"ha_upload_file",
"ha_upload_file_content"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"ha_list_files",
"ha_upload_file"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A sensitive-source → external-sink chain exists: ha_list_files → ha_upload_file."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "ha_list_addons",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_addon_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_install_addon",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_start_addon",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_stop_addon",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_restart_addon",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_uninstall_addon",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_addon_options",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_system_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_check_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_create_backup",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_list_backups",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_restart_core",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_check_api",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_get_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_update_core_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_get_components",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_get_error_log",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_list_automations",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_get_automation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_create_automation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_update_automation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_delete_automation",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_list_scripts",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_create_script",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_update_script",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_delete_script",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_list_scenes",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_create_scene",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_update_scene",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_delete_scene",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_list_helpers",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_create_helper",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_update_helper",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_delete_helper",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_list_dashboards",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_create_dashboard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_update_dashboard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_delete_dashboard",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_get_dashboard_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_save_dashboard_config",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_get_states",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_get_entity",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_call_service",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_list_services",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_render_template",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_list_entity_registry",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_list_devices",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_list_areas",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_create_area",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_get_history",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_get_logbook",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_get_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_fire_event",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_set_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_delete_state",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_get_calendars",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_get_calendar_events",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_handle_intent",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_list_files",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ha_read_file",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"read_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ha_upload_file",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"upload_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ha_upload_file_content",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"upload_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ha_delete_file",
"tags": [
"file-write"
],
"reasons": {
"file-write": [
"keyword \"delete_file\" in tool name"
]
}
},
{
"tool": "ha_mkdir",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "ha_file_exists",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "cd9875b714555fcca2c7617dcba38dc72931ab5493838f63a13416aea74d5468",
"stats": {
"tools": 66,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 1,
"low": 5,
"info": 0
}
}
}