Jambavan MCP Server
jambavan
npm
v2.0.2
Source verified
Published by beingmartinbmc — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Local-first MCP memory and code intelligence that helps coding agents recall repo context, decisions, failures, and review impact.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 14
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/tools/path-guard.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/path-guard.js:44`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: SENAMES = new Set([ '.npmrc', '.netrc', '.pgpass', '.htpasswd', 'id_rsa', 'id_dsa', 'id_ecdsa', 'id_ed25519',
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/path-guard.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/tools/path-guard.ts)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/tools/path-guard.ts:8`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: BASENAMES = new Set([ '.npmrc', '.netrc', '.pgpass', '.htpasswd', 'id_rsa', 'id_dsa', 'id_ecdsa', 'id_ed25519', 'c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/tools/path-guard.ts
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/context/diff-enricher.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/context/diff-enricher.js:45`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: matRecentChanges; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const path = __importStar(require("path")); /** * G
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/context/diff-enricher.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:68`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("path")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const server_1 = require("./mcp/server"); const jamb
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/memory/project-scope.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/memory/project-scope.js:41`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("path")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const scopeCache = new Map(); function gitOutput(roo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/memory/project-scope.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tool-check.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tool-check.js:47`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("path")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const perf_hooks_1 = require("perf_hooks"); const in
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tool-check.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/bash.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/bash.js:38`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: = createBashTool; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const path = __importStar(require("path")); const ut
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/bash.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/gui.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/gui.js:55`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: require("path")); const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const graph_1 = require("../knowledge/graph"); const
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/gui.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/html-handoff.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/html-handoff.js:49`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: buildHtmlHandoff; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const path = __importStar(require("path")); const ar
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/html-handoff.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/review-pack.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/review-pack.js:50`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: viewPackHandlers; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const fs = __importStar(require("fs")); const path =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/review-pack.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/search.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/search.js:39`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ateListFilesTool; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const fs = __importStar(require("fs")); const path =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/search.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/tools/session-handoff.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/session-handoff.js:49`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nHandoffHandlers; const child_process_1 = require("child_process"); const path = __importStar(require("path")); const ar
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/session-handoff.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (dist/index/ast-parser.js)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`dist/index/ast-parser.js:84`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rts const mod = require(pkg); // tree-sitter-typescript exports { typescript, tsx }; others export the l
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index/ast-parser.js
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/index/ast-parser.ts)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/index/ast-parser.ts:96`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: imports const mod = require(pkg); // tree-sitter-typescript exports { typescript, tsx }; others export the langu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/index/ast-parser.ts
Tools 7
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
jambavan_awakenno sensitive capabilityjambavan_compress_promptno sensitive capabilityjambavan_contextno sensitive capabilityjambavan_doctorno sensitive capabilityjambavan_graphno sensitive capabilityjambavan_indexno sensitive capabilityjambavan_watchno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (7 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.2 latest |
A 94/100 | 14 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-09 |
v2.0.1 |
A 94/100 | 14 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-07 |
v1.1.0 |
A 94/100 | 14 | 1.12.1 | 2026-07-28 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan jambavan --onlineMore in Developer Tools
Hotel booking MCP server — 300K+ properties, real confirmation numbers, loyalty programs. Builders monetize every booking via Stripe Connect. The first MCP server that completes real hotel reservations inside AI conversations.
Manage AdGuard Home through AI assistants
Read-only Azure DevOps for MCP clients using only your existing browser session — no PAT, no Azure CLI. Browse work items, pull requests, comments, attachments and Artifacts feeds across every project, repo and feed you can access.
MCP server for Adobe Experience Manager Assets integration development
Servidor MCP para el tiempo oficial de España (API pública OpenData de AEMET). Predicción, observación y avisos como herramientas MCP tipadas.
A standalone MCP stdio bridge for Affinity by Canva's local MCP SSE server.