Docker Agentic MCP Server
@jahrulnr/mcp-docker-agentic
npm
v0.1.2
Source verified
Published by jahrulnr — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for agentic Docker container operations via docker exec and docker cp
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 13
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([docker_read_file]) and tools that can send data out ([docker_exec, docker_exec_result, docker_exec_kill, docker_interactive_exec]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [docker_read_file] → sinks [docker_exec, docker_exec_result, docker_exec_kill, docker_interactive_exec]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow docker_read_file → docker_exec
high Tool "docker_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "docker_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool docker_exec
high Tool "docker_exec_result" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "docker_exec_result" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool docker_exec_result
high Tool "docker_exec_kill" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "docker_exec_kill" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool docker_exec_kill
high Tool "docker_interactive_exec" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "docker_interactive_exec" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool docker_interactive_exec
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/transport/mock.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/transport/mock.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { copyFileSync, cpSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, mkdtempSync, c
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/transport/mock.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/transport/real.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/transport/real.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { existsSync, mkdirSync, statSync } from "node:fs"; import { dirname } fr
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/transport/real.js
medium Tool "docker_write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "docker_write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool docker_write_file
low Mutating tool "docker_write_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "docker_write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool docker_write_file
low Mutating tool "docker_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "docker_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool docker_exec
low Mutating tool "docker_exec_result" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "docker_exec_result" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool docker_exec_result
low Mutating tool "docker_exec_kill" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "docker_exec_kill" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool docker_exec_kill
low Mutating tool "docker_interactive_exec" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "docker_interactive_exec" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool docker_interactive_exec
Tools 19
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
docker_execruns code / shelldocker_exec_killruns code / shelldocker_exec_resultruns code / shelldocker_interactive_execruns code / shelldocker_read_filereads sensitive datadocker_write_filewrites filesdocker_apply_patchno sensitive capabilitydocker_closeno sensitive capabilitydocker_cp_fromno sensitive capabilitydocker_cp_tono sensitive capability
Show 9 more tools ↓
docker_deleteno sensitive capabilitydocker_grepno sensitive capabilitydocker_interactive_closeno sensitive capabilitydocker_interactive_inputno sensitive capabilitydocker_interactive_listno sensitive capabilitydocker_list_dirno sensitive capabilitydocker_mkdirno sensitive capabilitydocker_pingno sensitive capabilitydocker_read_imageno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (19 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.2 latest |
A 94/100 | 13 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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