Itm Platform MCP Server
@itm-platform/mcp-server
npm
v1.0.20
Source verified
Published by itmplatform — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for ITM Platform
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 3 = 97. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −3 | capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005
Untrusted-input tools ([get_custom_fields]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create_issue]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.
Evidence: untrusted [get_custom_fields] → sinks [create_issue]
Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.
Location: flow get_custom_fields → create_issue
Tools 47
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
create_issuenetwork egressget_custom_fieldsingests untrusted inputaggregate_portfoliono sensitive capabilitybulk_update_activity_statusno sensitive capabilitybulk_update_task_statusno sensitive capabilitycreate_activityno sensitive capabilitycreate_projectno sensitive capabilitycreate_project_progressno sensitive capabilitycreate_riskno sensitive capabilitycreate_serviceno sensitive capability
Show 37 more tools ↓
create_taskno sensitive capabilitycreate_task_progressno sensitive capabilityget_custom_field_optionsno sensitive capabilityget_issueno sensitive capabilityget_projectno sensitive capabilityget_project_budgetno sensitive capabilityget_project_issuesno sensitive capabilityget_project_progressno sensitive capabilityget_project_purchasesno sensitive capabilityget_project_revenuesno sensitive capabilityget_project_risksno sensitive capabilityget_reference_datano sensitive capabilityget_riskno sensitive capabilityget_serviceno sensitive capabilityget_service_purchasesno sensitive capabilityget_service_revenuesno sensitive capabilityget_taskno sensitive capabilityget_task_effortno sensitive capabilityget_userno sensitive capabilitylist_project_tasksno sensitive capabilitylist_service_activitiesno sensitive capabilitylist_task_progressno sensitive capabilitylog_time_entryno sensitive capabilityquery_datamartno sensitive capabilitysearch_projectsno sensitive capabilitysearch_servicesno sensitive capabilitysearch_tasksno sensitive capabilitysearch_usersno sensitive capabilityupdate_activityno sensitive capabilityupdate_issueno sensitive capabilityupdate_projectno sensitive capabilityupdate_project_progressno sensitive capabilityupdate_riskno sensitive capabilityupdate_serviceno sensitive capabilityupdate_taskno sensitive capabilityupdate_task_effortno sensitive capabilityupdate_task_progressno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (47 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 5
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.20 latest |
A 97/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
v1.0.18 |
A 97/100 | 0 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-07 |
v1.0.17 |
A 97/100 | 0 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-03 |
v1.0.16 |
A 90/100 | 4 | 1.8.0 | 2026-07-23 |
v1.0.15 |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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