Isteam MCP Server
@isteam/mcp
npm
v3.0.0
Published by @isteam — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.
Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −33 | Hardcoded Google API key in server code ×2 MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
| −9.5 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink ×2 MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
Grade capped: 2 confirmed high findings → grade capped at D. A hard gate overrides the point total — no amount of clean surface buys back a confirmed catastrophe.
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.
Findings 9
high Hardcoded Google API key in server code (dist/daemon.js)MTC-SRC-008
A live-looking Google API key is hardcoded in `dist/daemon.js:76`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.
Evidence: Google API key: AIza…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server dist/daemon.js
high Hardcoded Google API key in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-008
A live-looking Google API key is hardcoded in `dist/index.js:66`. Secrets in source ship to everyone who installs the package and are a direct credential leak.
Evidence: Google API key: AIza…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/daemon-cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/daemon-cli.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/daemon-cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/daemon.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/daemon.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/daemon.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/service-installer.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/service-installer.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/service-installer.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/setup.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/setup.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: child_process
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/setup.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/setup.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/setup.js:175`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: fetch("https://is.team/api/mcp/auth"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/setup.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/service-installer.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/service-installer.js:23`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync(`command -v ${
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/service-installer.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/setup.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/setup.js:59`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: execSync(`which ${
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/setup.js
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.0.0 latest |
F 58/100 | 9 | 1.5.0 | 2026-07-22 |
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Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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