Bing Webmaster MCP Server
@isiahw1/mcp-server-bing-webmaster
npm
v1.0.2
Source verified
Published by isiahw1 — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for Bing Webmaster Tools integration
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 1.2 = 99. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −1.2 | Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 | supply-chain |
2. Client adoption risk — 99 − 6 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 5
high Shell/command execution in server code (run.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`run.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); const fs = require('fs'); // Check if we're in d
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server run.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/build.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/build.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); // Check if we're in a CI environment const isCI = process.env.CI === 'true';
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/build.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/postinstall.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/postinstall.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); console.log('\n🔧 MCP Server for Bing Webmaster Tools - Post Install'); consol
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/postinstall.js
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/validate.js)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/validate.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } = require('child_process'); let errors = 0; console.log('🔍 Running pre-publish validation...\n'); // Ch
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/validate.js
low Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010
"@isiahw1/mcp-server-bing-webmaster" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.
Evidence: node scripts/postinstall.js || true
Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.
Location: package @isiahw1/mcp-server-bing-webmaster
Tools 60
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
fetch_urlingests untrusted inputget_crawl_issuesingests untrusted inputget_crawl_settingsingests untrusted inputget_crawl_statsingests untrusted inputget_feedsingests untrusted inputget_page_query_statsingests untrusted inputget_page_statsingests untrusted inputupdate_crawl_settingsingests untrusted inputadd_blocked_urlno sensitive capabilityadd_connected_pageno sensitive capability
Show 50 more tools ↓
add_country_region_settingsno sensitive capabilityadd_deep_link_blockno sensitive capabilityadd_page_preview_blockno sensitive capabilityadd_query_parameterno sensitive capabilityadd_siteno sensitive capabilityadd_site_rolesno sensitive capabilityenable_disable_query_parameterno sensitive capabilityget_active_page_preview_blocksno sensitive capabilityget_blocked_urlsno sensitive capabilityget_children_url_infono sensitive capabilityget_children_url_traffic_infono sensitive capabilityget_connected_pagesno sensitive capabilityget_content_submission_quotano sensitive capabilityget_country_region_settingsno sensitive capabilityget_deep_link_blocksno sensitive capabilityget_feed_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_fetched_url_detailsno sensitive capabilityget_fetched_urlsno sensitive capabilityget_keyword_datano sensitive capabilityget_keyword_statsno sensitive capabilityget_link_countsno sensitive capabilityget_query_page_detail_statsno sensitive capabilityget_query_page_statsno sensitive capabilityget_query_parametersno sensitive capabilityget_query_statsno sensitive capabilityget_query_traffic_statsno sensitive capabilityget_rank_and_traffic_statsno sensitive capabilityget_related_keywordsno sensitive capabilityget_site_movesno sensitive capabilityget_site_rolesno sensitive capabilityget_sitesno sensitive capabilityget_url_infono sensitive capabilityget_url_linksno sensitive capabilityget_url_submission_quotano sensitive capabilityget_url_traffic_infono sensitive capabilityremove_blocked_urlno sensitive capabilityremove_country_region_settingsno sensitive capabilityremove_deep_link_blockno sensitive capabilityremove_feedno sensitive capabilityremove_page_preview_blockno sensitive capabilityremove_query_parameterno sensitive capabilityremove_siteno sensitive capabilityremove_site_roleno sensitive capabilityremove_sitemapno sensitive capabilitysubmit_contentno sensitive capabilitysubmit_site_moveno sensitive capabilitysubmit_sitemapno sensitive capabilitysubmit_urlno sensitive capabilitysubmit_url_batchno sensitive capabilityverify_siteno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (60 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.2 latest |
A 93/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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