Ironward MCP Server
ironward
npm
v3.2.0
Published by rayentr — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Security scanning for the vibe coding era. MCP server + CLI that finds secrets, auth bugs, SQL injection, XSS, IDOR, and vulnerable deps — and opens fix PRs. Works in Cursor, Claude Code, and VS Code. Bring your own model (Anthropic, OpenAI, Gemini, Groq,
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 4.2 = 96. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −4.2 | Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code ×2 MTC-SRC-008 | exfiltration |
2. Client adoption risk — 96 − 7 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 25
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/cli.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:1100`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ait readFile(resolve(d, ".npmrc"), "utf8"); } catch { /* none */ } }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/engines/dep-confusion.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/engines/dep-confusion.js:139`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: d @scope:registry=... to .npmrc to lock this scope to your private registry.", }); } else {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/engines/dep-confusion.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/engines/docker-rules.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/engines/docker-rules.js:112`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: es`, `*.pem`, `*.key`, `id_rsa*`). Prefer copying explicit paths.", appliesTo: DOCKERFILE, }, {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/engines/docker-rules.js
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (dist/engines/url-scanner.js)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`dist/engines/url-scanner.js:39`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "/config.json", "/.npmrc", ]; function normalizeHeaders(h) { if (h && typeof h.get === "function") {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/engines/url-scanner.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/commands/benchmark.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/benchmark.js:143`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: function Comp(){ return eval(window.x); }`, // ironward-ignore expectedRuleIds: ["react-eval-in-component", "eva
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/benchmark.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/engines/behavior-analyzer.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/engines/behavior-analyzer.js:12`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: // ironward-ignore "Function(", // ironward-ignore "base64", "atob", "Buffer.from(", ]; const ENV_TOKEN
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/engines/behavior-analyzer.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/engines/code-rules.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/engines/code-rules.js:43`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ction", title: "new Function() constructor", // ironward-ignore re: /\bnew\s+Function\s*\(/g, // ironwar
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/engines/code-rules.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/engines/xss-prefilter.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/engines/xss-prefilter.js:71`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ignore reason: "new Function() constructor — eval equivalent", // ironward-ignore }, { name: "se
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/engines/xss-prefilter.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/rules/python.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/rules/python.js:9`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: title: "Python eval() with f-string, concat, or request input", // ironward-ignore re: /(?<![A-Za-z0-9_
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/rules/python.js
high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/rules/websocket.js)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`dist/rules/websocket.js:66`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: title: "eval() or new Function() inside a ws.on('message') handler", // ironward-ignore // `ws.on('message
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/rules/websocket.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/benchmark.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/benchmark.js:291`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ection", code: `exec("ls " + req.body.dir, cb);`, // ironward-ignore expectedRuleIds: ["child-process-us
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/benchmark.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/diff.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/diff.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { readFile } from "node:fs/promise
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/diff.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/hooks.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/hooks.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; import { join, resolve } from "node:path"; const HOOK_MARKER = "# >>> ironward p
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/hooks.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/commands/login.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/login.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { exec } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { PROVIDERS, getProvider, readConf
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/login.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/engines/behavior-analyzer.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/engines/behavior-analyzer.js:10`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: xec", "spawn", "child_process", // ironward-ignore "eval", // ironward-ignore "Function(", // ironward-i
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/engines/behavior-analyzer.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/engines/code-rules.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/engines/code-rules.js:52`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ction", title: "child_process exec/spawn with request input", re: new RegExp(`\\b(?:exec|execSync|spawn|
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/engines/code-rules.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/engines/exploit-generator.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/engines/exploit-generator.js:618`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: s.mainModule.require(\\"child_process\\").execSync(\\"id\\").toString()"}'`, impact: "Arbitrary code execution a
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/engines/exploit-generator.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/engines/git-diff.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/engines/git-diff.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; import { resolve } from "node:path"; cons
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/engines/git-diff.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/rules/java.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/rules/java.js:107`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: /g, rationale: "exec(String) splits on whitespace and runs the result. With user input you get command injection
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/rules/java.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/rules/python.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/rules/python.js:93`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: thon"], title: "os.system() with user input", re: /\bos\s*\.\s*system\s*\(\s*(?:request\s*\.|flask\s*\.\
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/rules/python.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/commands/login.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/commands/login.js:18`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { const res = await fetch("https://api.anthropic.com/v1/messages", { method: "POST", headers: {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/commands/login.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/engines/dep-intel.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/engines/dep-intel.js:342`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const res = await fetch(`https://registry.npmjs.org/${encodeURIComponent(name)}`, { headers: { Acc
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/engines/dep-intel.js
medium Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/engines/exploit-generator.js)MTC-SRC-003
In the server's implementation (`dist/engines/exploit-generator.js:332`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: t = time.time() requests.post('https://yourapp.com${c.endpoint}', json={'${c.field}': u, 'password': 'x'}) // i
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/engines/exploit-generator.js
medium Hardcoded JSON Web Token in server code (dist/engines/exploit-generator.js)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded JSON Web Token (an embedded JSON Web Token (often an example or expired token)) appears in `dist/engines/exploit-generator.js:1`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.
Evidence: JSON Web Token: eyJh…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server dist/engines/exploit-generator.js
low Hardcoded AWS access key id in server code (dist/commands/benchmark.js)MTC-SRC-008
A hardcoded AWS access key id (a live-looking credential hardcoded in shipped code) appears in `dist/commands/benchmark.js:203`. Verify whether this is a real credential; if so, remove and rotate it.
Evidence: AWS access key id: AKIA…(redacted)
Fix: Remove the secret, rotate it, and load credentials from the environment or a secret store.
Location: server dist/commands/benchmark.js
Tools 13
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
fix_and_prno sensitive capabilityscan_auth_logicno sensitive capabilityscan_codeno sensitive capabilityscan_depsno sensitive capabilityscan_dockerno sensitive capabilityscan_for_secretsno sensitive capabilityscan_githubno sensitive capabilityscan_idorno sensitive capabilityscan_infrano sensitive capabilityscan_k8sno sensitive capability
Show 3 more tools ↓
scan_sqlino sensitive capabilityscan_urlno sensitive capabilityscan_xssno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (13 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v3.2.0 latest |
B 89/100 | 25 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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