Iobroker MCP Server
@iobroker/mcp-server
npm
v1.0.3
Source verified
Published by iobroker — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
MCP server for ioBroker
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 9
high Shell/command execution in server code (build/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`build/index.js:13`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: "node:fs")); const node_child_process_1 = require("node:child_process"); const zod_1 = require("zod"); const mcp_js_1 =
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server build/index.js
medium Tool "write_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "write_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "write_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool write_file
medium Tool "delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool delete_file
low Mutating tool "write_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "write_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool write_file
low Mutating tool "delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool delete_file
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "read_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "read_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool read_file · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "list_files"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "list_files" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool list_files · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "write_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "write_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool write_file · inputSchema.properties.path
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "delete_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "delete_file" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool delete_file · inputSchema.properties.path
Tools 28
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
delete_filewrites filesget_logsreads sensitive datalist_filesreads sensitive dataread_filereads sensitive datawrite_filewrites filescreate_sceneno sensitive capabilitycreate_stateno sensitive capabilitydelete_objectno sensitive capabilityfile_existsno sensitive capabilityget_objectno sensitive capability
Show 18 more tools ↓
get_statesno sensitive capabilityhistory_queryno sensitive capabilitylist_adaptersno sensitive capabilitylist_devicesno sensitive capabilitylist_functionsno sensitive capabilitylist_hostsno sensitive capabilitylist_instancesno sensitive capabilitylist_roomsno sensitive capabilitymkdirno sensitive capabilityping_hostno sensitive capabilityrename_fileno sensitive capabilitysearch_adapter_repositoryno sensitive capabilitysearch_objectsno sensitive capabilityset_objectno sensitive capabilityset_stateno sensitive capabilityset_statesno sensitive capabilitysystem_infono sensitive capabilitywrite_logno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (28 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.3 latest |
A 94/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v1.0.1 |
A 94/100 | 9 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v0.1.6 |
A 94/100 | 9 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-04 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @iobroker/mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Iobroker 1
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