Insite MCP Server

insite-mcp npm v1.2.4

Published by jowharshamshiri — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.

Trust grade
C
78/100
Last scanned
Trust
C · 78/100
How safe the published surface and source look. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
C Why this grade 100 − 21.7 = 78/100

Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−15.4 Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value MTC-SRC-010 injection
−6.3 Package runs install-time scripts MTC-SUP-010 supply-chain

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.

Findings 4

high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (dist/browser-manager.js)MTC-SRC-010

In the server's implementation (`dist/browser-manager.js:1328`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eval(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/browser-manager.js

high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/browser-manager.js)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`dist/browser-manager.js:652`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: new Function(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/browser-manager.js

medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (bin/insite.js)MTC-SRC-005

In the server's implementation (`bin/insite.js:24`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: import(serverPath)

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server bin/insite.js

medium Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)MTC-SUP-010

"insite-mcp" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. The large majority of malicious packages abuse install hooks to run code before you ever import them.

Fix: Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.

Location: package insite-mcp

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.2.4 latest C 78/100 4 1.5.0 2026-07-22

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MCP Trust Score: C · 78/100
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The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan insite-mcp --online

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