Inkscape MCP Server
inkscape-mcp
PyPI
v1.3.1
Published by aravindev — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server that drives the Inkscape CLI from a coding agent.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 11
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/inkscape_mcp/plugins/mcp_execute.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/inkscape_mcp/plugins/mcp_execute.py:123`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: exec(compile(code, "<mcp_execute>", "exec"), scope, scope) # noqa: S102 — exec is this extensio
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/inkscape_mcp/plugins/mcp_execute.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/inkscape_mcp/bus_manager.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/inkscape_mcp/bus_manager.py:90`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 — fixed gdbus path [ gdbus_path,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/inkscape_mcp/bus_manager.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/inkscape_mcp/clipboard.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/inkscape_mcp/clipboard.py:116`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e way. try: subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 — cmd is built from a fixed allowlist (xclip / wl-copy)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/inkscape_mcp/clipboard.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/inkscape_mcp/plugins/ag_batch_trace.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/inkscape_mcp/plugins/ag_batch_trace.py:74`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ommand result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60) # noqa: S603 — cmd built from v
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/inkscape_mcp/plugins/ag_batch_trace.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/inkscape_mcp/plugins/mcp_execute.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/inkscape_mcp/plugins/mcp_execute.py:123`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: exec(compile(code, "<mcp_execute>", "exec"), scope, scope) # noqa: S102 — exec is this extensio
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/inkscape_mcp/plugins/mcp_execute.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/inkscape_mcp/tools/live.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/inkscape_mcp/tools/live.py:708`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ry: completed = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 — fixed `inkscape --action-list`, no user input [cli_e
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/inkscape_mcp/tools/live.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/inkscape_mcp/win_dbus_client.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/inkscape_mcp/win_dbus_client.py:51`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: proc = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603 — cmd[0] is a fixed gdbus path; args are built here
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/inkscape_mcp/win_dbus_client.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/conftest.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/conftest.py:24`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: returncode=2) out = subprocess.run([binary, "--version"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10) match = re
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/conftest.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_clipboard.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_clipboard.py:29`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: == "x11": out = subprocess.run( ["xclip", "-selection", "clipboard", "-t", "image/x-inkscape-svg", "
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_clipboard.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_regressions.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_regressions.py:679`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: vg>\n" ) proc = subprocess.run( [ sys.executable, "src/inkscape_mcp/plugins/ag_u
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_regressions.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tools/repo_stats.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tools/repo_stats.py:73`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: e: try: r = subprocess.run( ["git", "rev-parse", "--short", "HEAD"], # noqa: S607 — git on PATH
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tools/repo_stats.py
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.3.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 11 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v1.1.3 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-31 |
v1.1.2 |
A 93/100 | 10 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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