Kdrive — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.8.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.8.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"target": {
"id": "@infomaniak/mcp-server-kdrive",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@infomaniak/mcp-server-kdrive"
},
"server": {
"name": "@infomaniak/mcp-server-kdrive"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.8"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"reads sensitive or local data",
"has a read → egress path (a data-exfiltration surface)",
"untrusted-input, sensitive-source and egress co-exist across tools (toxic-flow surface)"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"untrusted-input",
"sensitive-source"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (14 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-FLOW-002",
"title": "Completed toxic-flow trifecta across tools",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: kdrive_download_file → kdrive_shared_with_me → kdrive_upload_file. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.",
"remediation": "Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.",
"location": {
"kind": "flow",
"name": "kdrive_download_file → kdrive_shared_with_me → kdrive_upload_file"
},
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"references": [],
"data": {
"untrusted": [
"kdrive_download_file"
],
"sources": [
"kdrive_shared_with_me"
],
"sinks": [
"kdrive_upload_file"
],
"path": [
"kdrive_download_file",
"kdrive_shared_with_me",
"kdrive_upload_file"
],
"edges": [
{
"from": "kdrive_download_file",
"to": "kdrive_shared_with_me",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
},
{
"from": "kdrive_shared_with_me",
"to": "kdrive_upload_file",
"kind": "agent-mediated"
}
],
"wired": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/kdrive-client.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/kdrive-client.js:24`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/kdrive-client.js"
},
"evidence": "fetch(`https://api.infomaniak.com/3/drive/${this.driveId}/files/search?${params}`",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/kdrive-client.js",
"line": 24
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [
{
"id": "flow-1",
"severity": "critical",
"confidence": "strong",
"untrustedInput": [
"kdrive_download_file"
],
"sensitiveSource": [
"kdrive_shared_with_me"
],
"externalSink": [
"kdrive_upload_file"
],
"selfContained": false,
"path": [
"kdrive_download_file",
"kdrive_shared_with_me",
"kdrive_upload_file"
],
"pathWired": false,
"description": "A cross-tool exfiltration chain exists: kdrive_download_file → kdrive_shared_with_me → kdrive_upload_file."
}
],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "kdrive_search",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kdrive_upload_file",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"upload_file\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "kdrive_list",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kdrive_rename",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kdrive_move",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kdrive_delete",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kdrive_share_link",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kdrive_share_access",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kdrive_create_folder",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kdrive_restore",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kdrive_download_file",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"download\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "kdrive_info",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kdrive_recents",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "kdrive_shared_with_me",
"tags": [
"sensitive-source"
],
"reasons": {
"sensitive-source": [
"keyword \"list_files\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "4ea0ecf7a1ffb641e6039b919f3d44183a987ef8b970e27f030829c657f34919",
"stats": {
"tools": 14,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 1,
"high": 0,
"medium": 1,
"low": 0,
"info": 0
}
}
}