Indusk — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "@infinitedusky/indusk-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "@infinitedusky/indusk-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "@infinitedusky/indusk-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "B",
"score": {
"score": 81,
"threatScore": 89,
"grade": "B",
"band": "B",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 11.03,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 6.3
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.5,
"appliedPenalty": 3.15
},
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"rawWeight": 9,
"confidenceMult": 0.7,
"diminishingFactor": 0.25,
"appliedPenalty": 1.58
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "none",
"label": "publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read",
"appliedPenalty": 2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (42 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-001",
"title": "Tool \"quality_check\" exposes command/code execution",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "Tool \"quality_check\" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter \"command\"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.",
"remediation": "Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "quality_check"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (admin/.next/build/chunks/node_modules__pnpm_0e-dfa2._.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`admin/.next/build/chunks/node_modules__pnpm_0e-dfa2._.js:2548`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "admin/.next/build/chunks/node_modules__pnpm_0e-dfa2._.js"
},
"evidence": "); let templateFn = new Function(`return ${template}`)(); return templateFn(comparator); } /** * Sort the given",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "admin/.next/build/chunks/node_modules__pnpm_0e-dfa2._.js",
"line": 2548,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (admin/.next/server/chunks/ssr/[root-of-the-server]__0p.51_4._.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`admin/.next/server/chunks/ssr/[root-of-the-server]__0p.51_4._.js:1`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "admin/.next/server/chunks/ssr/[root-of-the-server]__0p.51_4._.js"
},
"evidence": "+str.trim()+\";\\n}());\"),eval(str)||{}}catch(err){if(!1!==wrap&&/(unexpected|identifier)/i.test(err.message))return parse",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "admin/.next/server/chunks/ssr/[root-of-the-server]__0p.51_4._.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-001",
"title": "Dynamic code execution in server code (hooks/eval-trigger.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`hooks/eval-trigger.js:186`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "hooks/eval-trigger.js"
},
"evidence": "ined ${drained} pending eval(s); ${failed.length} FAILED and remain queued for retry; ${alreadyDrained} already drained.",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-001",
"file": "hooks/eval-trigger.js",
"line": 186,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (admin/.next/build/chunks/[root-of-the-server]__0-n8fv.._.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`admin/.next/build/chunks/[root-of-the-server]__0-n8fv.._.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "admin/.next/build/chunks/[root-of-the-server]__0-n8fv.._.js"
},
"evidence": "s = [ \"[turbopack-node]/child_process/globals.ts [postcss] (ecmascript)\", ((__turbopack_context__, module, exports) => {",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "admin/.next/build/chunks/[root-of-the-server]__0-n8fv.._.js",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (admin/.next/build/postcss.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`admin/.next/build/postcss.js:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "admin/.next/build/postcss.js"
},
"evidence": ") R.m(\"[turbopack-node]/child_process/globals.ts [postcss] (ecmascript)\") R.m(\"[turbopack-node]/child_process/evaluate.t",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "admin/.next/build/postcss.js",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (admin/.next/server/chunks/ssr/[root-of-the-server]__0f9b~qs._.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`admin/.next/server/chunks/ssr/[root-of-the-server]__0f9b~qs._.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "admin/.next/server/chunks/ssr/[root-of-the-server]__0f9b~qs._.js"
},
"evidence": ")=>{b.exports=a.x(\"node:child_process\",()=>require(\"node:child_process\"))},54779,a=>{\"use strict\";var b=a.i(44673),c=a.i",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "admin/.next/server/chunks/ssr/[root-of-the-server]__0f9b~qs._.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/bin/commands/agent.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/bin/commands/agent.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/bin/commands/agent.js"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { existsSync, readFileSync, renameSync, writeFileSync } from \"node:fs\"; i",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/bin/commands/agent.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/bin/commands/doppler.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/bin/commands/doppler.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/bin/commands/doppler.js"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { existsSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, statSync, writeFileSync } from \"",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/bin/commands/doppler.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/bin/commands/eval.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/bin/commands/eval.js:152`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/bin/commands/eval.js"
},
"evidence": "} = await import(\"node:child_process\"); const { rmSync, writeFileSync } = await import(\"node:fs\"); const { base",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/bin/commands/eval.js",
"line": 152,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/bin/commands/extensions.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/bin/commands/extensions.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/bin/commands/extensions.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { cpSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, readdirSync, readFileSync, rmSync, write",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/bin/commands/extensions.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/bin/commands/infra.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/bin/commands/infra.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/bin/commands/infra.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from \"node:fs\"; im",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/bin/commands/infra.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/bin/commands/init-docs.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/bin/commands/init-docs.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/bin/commands/init-docs.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from \"node:fs\"; im",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/bin/commands/init-docs.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (dist/bin/commands/init.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/bin/commands/init.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/bin/commands/init.js"
},
"evidence": "spawnSync } from \"node:child_process\"; import { cpSync, existsSync, mkdirSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync } from \"node",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "dist/bin/commands/init.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (dist/server/index.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/server/index.js:35`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/server/index.js"
},
"evidence": "s(currentVersion) { fetch(\"https://registry.npmjs.org/@infinitedusky/indusk-mcp/latest\") .then((res) => res.",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "dist/server/index.js",
"line": 35,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/bin/commands/eval.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/bin/commands/eval.js:167`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/bin/commands/eval.js"
},
"evidence": "HEAD try { execSync(`git worktree add \"${worktreePath}\" HEAD --detach`, { cwd: projectRoot,",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/bin/commands/eval.js",
"line": 167,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/bin/commands/extensions.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/bin/commands/extensions.js:188`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/bin/commands/extensions.js"
},
"evidence": "e: true }); execSync(`npm pack ${pkg} --pack-destination \"${tmpDir}\"`, { encoding: \"utf-8\",",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/bin/commands/extensions.js",
"line": 188,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-009",
"title": "Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/tools/graph-tools.js)",
"category": "injection",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/graph-tools.js:31`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "dist/tools/graph-tools.js"
},
"evidence": "t to Redis port execSync(`node -e \"const s=require('net').connect(6379,'${host}');s.setTimeout(2000);s.on('conne",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-009",
"file": "dist/tools/graph-tools.js",
"line": 31,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-006",
"title": "Unconstrained command parameter \"command\" on \"quality_check\"",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "Tool \"quality_check\" takes a command-shaped parameter \"command\" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.",
"remediation": "Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.",
"location": {
"kind": "tool",
"name": "quality_check",
"field": "inputSchema.properties.command"
},
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"param": "command"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (admin/.next/build/chunks/[turbopack]_runtime.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`admin/.next/build/chunks/[turbopack]_runtime.js:588`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "admin/.next/build/chunks/[turbopack]_runtime.js"
},
"evidence": "y { raw = await import(id); } catch (err) { // TODO(alexkirsz) This can happen when a client-side mo",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "admin/.next/build/chunks/[turbopack]_runtime.js",
"line": 588,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (admin/.next/server/chunks/[turbopack]_runtime.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`admin/.next/server/chunks/[turbopack]_runtime.js:601`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "admin/.next/server/chunks/[turbopack]_runtime.js"
},
"evidence": "y { raw = await import(id); } catch (err) { // TODO(alexkirsz) This can happen when a client-side mo",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "admin/.next/server/chunks/[turbopack]_runtime.js",
"line": 601,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (admin/.next/server/chunks/ssr/[turbopack]_runtime.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`admin/.next/server/chunks/ssr/[turbopack]_runtime.js:601`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "admin/.next/server/chunks/ssr/[turbopack]_runtime.js"
},
"evidence": "y { raw = await import(id); } catch (err) { // TODO(alexkirsz) This can happen when a client-side mo",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "admin/.next/server/chunks/ssr/[turbopack]_runtime.js",
"line": 601,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (hooks/eval-trigger.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`hooks/eval-trigger.js:313`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
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"location": {
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"name": "hooks/eval-trigger.js"
},
"evidence": "olvedFindings } = await import(findingsPath); const unresolved = getUnresolvedFindings(statePath); if (unresolved.le",
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"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": "hooks/eval-trigger.js",
"line": 313,
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}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-CAP-005",
"title": "Mutating tool \"quality_check\" declares no destructiveHint",
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"confidence": "heuristic",
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"remediation": "Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.",
"location": {
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"name": "quality_check"
},
"data": {
"tags": [
"code-exec"
]
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-012",
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"category": "hygiene",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"@infinitedusky/indusk-mcp\" has no declared license. This is a legal/reuse concern, not a security finding.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "@infinitedusky/indusk-mcp"
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-011",
"title": "Package declares no source repository",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "info",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "\"@infinitedusky/indusk-mcp\" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.",
"remediation": "Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.",
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"kind": "package",
"name": "@infinitedusky/indusk-mcp"
}
}
],
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},
{
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},
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},
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},
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},
{
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},
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},
{
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{
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},
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{
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{
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{
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{
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},
{
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},
{
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},
{
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},
{
"tool": "graph_capture",
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},
{
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},
{
"tool": "highlight",
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},
{
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},
{
"tool": "highlight_mark_processed",
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},
{
"tool": "list_lessons",
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},
{
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},
{
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},
{
"tool": "get_plan_status",
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},
{
"tool": "advance_plan",
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},
{
"tool": "order_plans",
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},
{
"tool": "get_quality_config",
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"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "suggest_rule",
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},
{
"tool": "quality_check",
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"code-exec"
],
"reasons": {
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"parameter \"command\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "get_system_version",
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"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_project_info",
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},
{
"tool": "check_health",
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"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_skill_versions",
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"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_skill_summaries",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "extensions_status",
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"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "tail_logs",
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}
],
"surfaceDigest": "1f724ce21259ed6a37fd016a52e99aea726db45f9e157b2513dc7a59bcdf236f",
"stats": {
"tools": 42,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 14,
"medium": 9,
"low": 1,
"info": 2
}
}
}