Inalign MCP Server
inalign-mcp
PyPI
v0.9.5
Published by intellirim — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 12
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/inalign_mcp/ai_analyzer.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/inalign_mcp/ai_analyzer.py:47`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: credentials|\.aws|\.ssh|id_rsa|\.pem)[^\s]*', '[MASKED_SENSITIVE_PATH]'), ] def _decode_prompt(encoded: str, license
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/inalign_mcp/ai_analyzer.py
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/inalign_mcp/context.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/inalign_mcp/context.py:192`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , r"\.crt$", r"id_rsa", r"\.ssh", r"password", r"api[_-]?key", r"\.aws", r"\.gcp", r"\.azure"
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/inalign_mcp/context.py
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/inalign_mcp/owasp.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/inalign_mcp/owasp.py:39`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , ".key", ".pem", "id_rsa", "id_ed25519", ".aws", ".pypirc", ".npmrc", ".netrc", "token", ".kube/config", ]
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/inalign_mcp/owasp.py
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/inalign_mcp/risk_analyzer.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/inalign_mcp/risk_analyzer.py:54`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: , ".key", ".pem", "id_rsa", "id_ed25519", ".aws", ".pypirc", ".npmrc", ".netrc", "token", ".kube/config", "htp
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/inalign_mcp/risk_analyzer.py
high Reads a sensitive credential path or dumps the environment (src/inalign_mcp/scanner.py)MTC-SRC-006
In the server's implementation (`src/inalign_mcp/scanner.py:72`): Reading private keys / cloud credentials, or serializing the whole environment, is a sensitive-data source that becomes exfiltration when combined with any egress. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: |cat|type)\s+.*(?:\.env|id_rsa|\.aws|credentials)", "INJ-520", "file_access", Severity.CRITICAL, 0.94), (r"(?i)(?:w
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/inalign_mcp/scanner.py
high Tool "record_user_command" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "record_user_command" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "command"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool record_user_command
high Shell/command execution in server code (setup.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`setup.py:106`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run( [sys.executable, "-c", "from inalign_mcp.server import server; prin
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server setup.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/inalign_mcp/dashboard.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/inalign_mcp/dashboard.py:2156`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: om PyPI...") ret = subprocess.run([python, "-m", "pip", "install", "inalign-mcp", "--upgrade", "-q"], capt
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/inalign_mcp/dashboard.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/inalign_mcp/install.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/inalign_mcp/install.py:52`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: yPI...") ret = subprocess.run( [python, "-m", "pip", "install", "inalign-mcp", "--upgrade", "-q"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/inalign_mcp/install.py
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command" on "record_user_command"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "record_user_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool record_user_command · inputSchema.properties.command
medium Unconstrained command parameter "command_hash_only" on "record_user_command"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "record_user_command" takes a command-shaped parameter "command_hash_only" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool record_user_command · inputSchema.properties.command_hash_only
low Mutating tool "record_user_command" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "record_user_command" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool record_user_command
Tools 39
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
record_user_commandruns code / shellanalyze_riskno sensitive capabilityanalyze_sessionno sensitive capabilityanchor_batchno sensitive capabilityanchor_sessionno sensitive capabilityanchor_statusno sensitive capabilitycheck_owasp_complianceno sensitive capabilitydetect_driftno sensitive capabilityexport_otelno sensitive capabilityexport_reportno sensitive capability
Show 29 more tools ↓
generate_ai_reportno sensitive capabilitygenerate_audit_reportno sensitive capabilitygenerate_compliance_reportno sensitive capabilityget_agent_riskno sensitive capabilityget_agent_topologyno sensitive capabilityget_behavior_baselineno sensitive capabilityget_behavior_profileno sensitive capabilityget_cost_reportno sensitive capabilityget_permission_matrixno sensitive capabilityget_policyno sensitive capabilityget_provenanceno sensitive capabilityget_user_riskno sensitive capabilitylist_agents_riskno sensitive capabilitylist_policiesno sensitive capabilitylist_sessionsno sensitive capabilityontology_populateno sensitive capabilityontology_queryno sensitive capabilityontology_security_scanno sensitive capabilityontology_statsno sensitive capabilityquery_provenance_nlno sensitive capabilityrecord_actionno sensitive capabilityset_agent_permissionsno sensitive capabilityset_policyno sensitive capabilitysimulate_policyno sensitive capabilitytrack_agent_interactionno sensitive capabilitytrack_costno sensitive capabilityverify_anchorno sensitive capabilityverify_provenanceno sensitive capabilityverify_third_partyno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (39 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.9.5 latest |
A 93/100 | 12 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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