Mitre Attack (imouiche) MCP Server
@imouiche/mitre-attack-mcp-server
npm
v0.1.4
Published by @imouiche — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Complete MCP server for MITRE ATT&CK threat intelligence framework with 50+ tools
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 1
high Shell/command execution in server code (run.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`run.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: st { spawn } = require('child_process'); const path = require('path'); // Set PYTHONPATH to include src directory const
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server run.js
Tools 65
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
generate_layerno sensitive capabilityget_all_assetsno sensitive capabilityget_all_campaignsno sensitive capabilityget_all_datacomponentsno sensitive capabilityget_all_datasourcesno sensitive capabilityget_all_groupsno sensitive capabilityget_all_matricesno sensitive capabilityget_all_mitigationsno sensitive capabilityget_all_parent_techniquesno sensitive capabilityget_all_softwareno sensitive capability
Show 55 more tools ↓
get_all_subtechniquesno sensitive capabilityget_all_tacticsno sensitive capabilityget_all_techniquesno sensitive capabilityget_assets_targeted_by_techniqueno sensitive capabilityget_attack_idno sensitive capabilityget_campaigns_attributed_to_groupno sensitive capabilityget_campaigns_by_aliasno sensitive capabilityget_campaigns_using_softwareno sensitive capabilityget_campaigns_using_techniqueno sensitive capabilityget_data_statsno sensitive capabilityget_datacomponents_detecting_techniqueno sensitive capabilityget_group_by_nameno sensitive capabilityget_group_techniquesno sensitive capabilityget_groups_attributing_to_campaignno sensitive capabilityget_groups_by_aliasno sensitive capabilityget_groups_using_softwareno sensitive capabilityget_groups_using_techniqueno sensitive capabilityget_layer_metadatano sensitive capabilityget_mitigations_mitigating_techniqueno sensitive capabilityget_nameno sensitive capabilityget_object_by_attack_idno sensitive capabilityget_object_by_stix_idno sensitive capabilityget_objects_by_contentno sensitive capabilityget_objects_by_nameno sensitive capabilityget_objects_by_typeno sensitive capabilityget_objects_created_afterno sensitive capabilityget_objects_modified_afterno sensitive capabilityget_parent_technique_of_subtechniqueno sensitive capabilityget_procedure_examples_by_tacticno sensitive capabilityget_procedure_examples_by_techniqueno sensitive capabilityget_revoked_techniquesno sensitive capabilityget_softwareno sensitive capabilityget_software_by_aliasno sensitive capabilityget_software_used_by_campaignno sensitive capabilityget_software_used_by_groupno sensitive capabilityget_software_using_techniqueno sensitive capabilityget_statsno sensitive capabilityget_stix_typeno sensitive capabilityget_subtechniques_of_techniqueno sensitive capabilityget_tactics_by_matrixno sensitive capabilityget_tactics_by_techniqueno sensitive capabilityget_technique_by_idno sensitive capabilityget_technique_tacticsno sensitive capabilityget_techniques_by_platformno sensitive capabilityget_techniques_by_tacticno sensitive capabilityget_techniques_detected_by_datacomponentno sensitive capabilityget_techniques_mitigated_by_mitigationno sensitive capabilityget_techniques_targeting_assetno sensitive capabilityget_techniques_used_by_campaignno sensitive capabilityget_techniques_used_by_groupno sensitive capabilityget_techniques_used_by_group_softwareno sensitive capabilityget_techniques_used_by_softwareno sensitive capabilitysearch_groupsno sensitive capabilitysearch_softwareno sensitive capabilitysearch_techniquesno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (65 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.4 latest |
A 93/100 | 1 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @imouiche/mitre-attack-mcp-server --onlineOther implementations of Mitre Attack 1
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →
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