Img Gen — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "img-gen-mcp",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "img-gen-mcp"
},
"server": {
"name": "img-gen-mcp"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 93,
"threatScore": 100,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 0,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"ingests untrusted external content (a prompt-injection entry point)",
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"untrusted-input",
"code-exec",
"external-sink"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (25 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (server.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`server.js:5`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "server.js"
},
"evidence": "{ execFile } from 'node:child_process'; import http from 'node:http'; import FormData from 'form-data'; import axios fro",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "server.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (server.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`server.js:228`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "server.js"
},
"evidence": "const response = await axios.post('https://openrouter.ai/api/v1/chat/completions', { model, messages: [{ role:",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "server.js",
"line": 228,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/acp-smoke.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/acp-smoke.mjs:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/acp-smoke.mjs"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { once } from 'node:events'; const port = Number(process.argv[2] || proc",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/acp-smoke.mjs",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/http-smoke.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/http-smoke.mjs:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/http-smoke.mjs"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import { once } from 'node:events'; const port = Number(process.argv[2] || proc",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/http-smoke.mjs",
"line": 2,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/smoke-image.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/smoke-image.mjs:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/smoke-image.mjs"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; import readline from 'node:readline'; import path from 'node:path'; function pa",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/smoke-image.mjs",
"line": 3,
"nonRuntime": true
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/test-workflow-loop.mjs)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/test-workflow-loop.mjs:4`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "scripts/test-workflow-loop.mjs"
},
"evidence": "rt { spawn } from 'node:child_process'; const root = process.cwd(); const stateFile = path.join(root, '.image-mcp-workf",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": "scripts/test-workflow-loop.mjs",
"line": 4,
"nonRuntime": true
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "kilo_generate_image",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "generate_image",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "list_image_models",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_provider_status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_model_capabilities",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "edit_image",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "background_remove",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "finalize_image",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "resize_image",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "auto_crop",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "optimize_image",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "submit_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "batch_generate_image",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "create_workflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update_workflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "add_workflow_step",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "close_workflow_step",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get_workflow",
"tags": [
"untrusted-input"
],
"reasons": {
"untrusted-input": [
"keyword \"fetch\""
]
}
},
{
"tool": "resume_workflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "finalize_workflow",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "analyze_image_result",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "inspect_cutout",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "compare_variants",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "suggest_next_step",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "324bb36966381195baa6efb53e05269d1b9f30b3cddc78966cc544f770aab4af",
"stats": {
"tools": 25,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 1,
"medium": 1,
"low": 4,
"info": 0
}
}
}