GitHub (imenam) (imenam) MCP Server

@imenam/mcp-github npm v1.1.51

Published by @imenam — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.

A controlled, security-focused GitHub server for AI agents.

Trust grade
A
92/100
Last scanned
Trust
A · 92/100
How safe the published surface and source look. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
A Why this grade 100 − 8.4 = 92/100

Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−6.3 Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 injection
−2.1 Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 supply-chain

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.

Findings 6

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/__tests__/utils/git.test.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/__tests__/utils/git.test.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/__tests__/utils/git.test.js

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/gui-process.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/gui-process.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/gui-process.js

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/exec.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/exec.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/utils/exec.js

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/utils/git.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/git.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/utils/git.js

medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/utils/git.js)MTC-SRC-009

In the server's implementation (`dist/utils/git.js:64`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: execSync(`chown -R ${owner} "${

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/utils/git.js

low Package has no source repositoryMTC-SUP-011

"@imenam/mcp-github" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.

Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.

Location: package @imenam/mcp-github

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.1.51 latest A 92/100 6 1.5.0 2026-07-22
v1.1.50 D 67/100 6 1.3.1 2026-07-21

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MCP Trust Score: A · 92/100
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Other implementations of GitHub (imenam) 27

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 28 side by side →

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