Imas MCP Server

imas-mcp PyPI v3.2.0

Published by iterorganization — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.

Trust grade
B
87/100
Last scanned
Trust
B · 87/100
How safe the published surface and source look. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
B Why this grade 100 − 13.1 = 87/100

Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−11 Unsafe deserialization ×3 MTC-SRC-007 permissions
−2.1 Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 supply-chain

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.

Findings 8

high Shell/command execution in server code (benchmarks/benchmark_runner.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`benchmarks/benchmark_runner.py:35`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: subprocess.run(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server benchmarks/benchmark_runner.py

high Shell/command execution in server code (scripts/add_docs.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`scripts/add_docs.py:134`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: shell=True

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server scripts/add_docs.py

high Shell/command execution in server code (scripts/dd_version.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`scripts/dd_version.py:214`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: subprocess.run(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server scripts/dd_version.py

high Shell/command execution in server code (scripts/docs.py)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`scripts/docs.py:82`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: subprocess.run(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server scripts/docs.py

medium Unsafe deserialization (imas_mcp/embeddings/encoder.py)MTC-SRC-007

In the server's implementation (`imas_mcp/embeddings/encoder.py:378`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: pickle.load(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server imas_mcp/embeddings/encoder.py

medium Unsafe deserialization (imas_mcp/search/physics_search.py)MTC-SRC-007

In the server's implementation (`imas_mcp/search/physics_search.py:123`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: pickle.load(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server imas_mcp/search/physics_search.py

medium Unsafe deserialization (imas_mcp/structure/mermaid_generator.py)MTC-SRC-007

In the server's implementation (`imas_mcp/structure/mermaid_generator.py:240`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: pickle.load(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server imas_mcp/structure/mermaid_generator.py

low Package has no source repositoryMTC-SUP-011

"imas-mcp" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.

Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.

Location: package imas-mcp

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v3.2.0 latest B 87/100 8 1.5.0 2026-07-22

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MCP Trust Score: B · 87/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan imas-mcp --online --registry pypi

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