Imas Codex MCP Server
imas-codex
PyPI
v5.3.0
Published by iterorganization — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
An IMAS Data Dictionary MCP server
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Unsafe deserialization MTC-SRC-007 | permissions |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 7 = 87. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 19
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (imas_codex/ids/transforms.py)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`imas_codex/ids/transforms.py:136`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ["np"] = np return eval(transform_expression, {"__builtins__": {}}, context) # noqa: S307 def set_nested(obj: An
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server imas_codex/ids/transforms.py
high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (imas_codex/llm/server.py)MTC-SRC-010
In the server's implementation (`imas_codex/llm/server.py:1928`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = eval(code, repl) if result is not None:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server imas_codex/llm/server.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (imas_codex/ids/codegen.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`imas_codex/ids/codegen.py:175`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: data = eval(_sig["data_code"]) time = eval(_sig["time_code"]) if _sig["time_code"] else
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server imas_codex/ids/codegen.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (imas_codex/ids/transforms.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`imas_codex/ids/transforms.py:136`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ["np"] = np return eval(transform_expression, {"__builtins__": {}}, context) # noqa: S307 def set_nested(obj: An
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server imas_codex/ids/transforms.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (imas_codex/llm/server.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`imas_codex/llm/server.py:1928`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = eval(code, repl) if result is not None:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server imas_codex/llm/server.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (imas_codex/remote/executor.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`imas_codex/remote/executor.py:1127`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ript_b64}");' f'exec(compile(s,"script","exec"))' ) # Remote runner: restore site-packages and PYTHONPA
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server imas_codex/remote/executor.py
high Dynamic code execution in server code (imas_codex/remote/ssh_worker.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`imas_codex/remote/ssh_worker.py:114`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: tins__} exec(compile(script, "<remote>", "exec"), ns) result = {"ok": True, "stdout": bu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server imas_codex/remote/ssh_worker.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (imas_codex/cli/compute.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`imas_codex/cli/compute.py:82`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10) jobs = [] for li
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server imas_codex/cli/compute.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (imas_codex/cli/config_cli.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`imas_codex/cli/config_cli.py:181`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: " result = subprocess.run( ["gh", "gist", "clone", effective_gist_id, str(gist_dir)],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server imas_codex/cli/config_cli.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (imas_codex/cli/credentials.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`imas_codex/cli/credentials.py:483`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15) if result.returncode !=
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server imas_codex/cli/credentials.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (imas_codex/cli/embed.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`imas_codex/cli/embed.py:530`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: subprocess.run(["systemctl", "--user", "daemon-reload"], check=True) subprocess.run(
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server imas_codex/cli/embed.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (imas_codex/cli/graph/data.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`imas_codex/cli/graph/data.py:118`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: v" result = subprocess.run( ["scp", "-q", str(env_file), f"{profile.host}:{remote_env}"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server imas_codex/cli/graph/data.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (imas_codex/cli/graph/registry.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`imas_codex/cli/graph/registry.py:359`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: result = subprocess.run( ["oras", "tag", artifact_ref, "latest"],
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server imas_codex/cli/graph/registry.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (imas_codex/cli/graph/server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`imas_codex/cli/graph/server.py:210`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: if foreground: subprocess.run(cmd) else: proc = subprocess.Popen( cmd, stdo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server imas_codex/cli/graph/server.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (imas_codex/cli/graph_progress.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`imas_codex/cli/graph_progress.py:205`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt errors. result = subprocess.run(cmd, stderr=subprocess.PIPE, text=True, cwd=cwd) if result.returncode != 0:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server imas_codex/cli/graph_progress.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (imas_codex/cli/host.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`imas_codex/cli/host.py:79`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try: result = subprocess.run(["who"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5) info["users"] = (
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server imas_codex/cli/host.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (imas_codex/remote/executor.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`imas_codex/remote/executor.py:934`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: 5py"): try: __import__(mod) caps[mod] = True except ImportError: caps[mod] = False json.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server imas_codex/remote/executor.py
medium Unsafe deserialization (imas_codex/core/clusters.py)MTC-SRC-007
In the server's implementation (`imas_codex/core/clusters.py:138`): Deserializing untrusted data with these APIs can execute arbitrary code (a well-known RCE gadget class). This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: cache = pickle.load(f) if isinstance(cache, EmbeddingCache): return cache.do
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server imas_codex/core/clusters.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (benchmarks/benchmark_runner.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`benchmarks/benchmark_runner.py:35`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: time() result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True) end_time = time.time() retu
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server benchmarks/benchmark_runner.py
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v5.3.0 latest |
B 87/100 | 19 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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