Imagine (n24q02m) MCP Server
imagine-mcp
PyPI
v1.11.1
Published by n24q02m — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
MCP server for image/video understanding & generation (Gemini/OpenAI/Grok)
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 1 = 99. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/cf_deploy_config.mjs)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/cf_deploy_config.mjs:37`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ort { spawnSync } from 'child_process'; const root = process.cwd(); const srcConfig = join(root, 'wrangler.jsonc'); con
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/cf_deploy_config.mjs
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (scripts/deploy_cf.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`scripts/deploy_cf.py:113`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ath) -> str: return subprocess.run( ["git", "-C", str(repo), "rev-parse", "--short", "HEAD"], captur
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server scripts/deploy_cf.py
low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (tests/test_stdio_direct.py)MTC-SRC-002
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`tests/test_stdio_direct.py:30`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: T": "stdio"} return subprocess.Popen( [sys.executable, "-m", "imagine_mcp"], stdin=subprocess.PIPE,
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server tests/test_stdio_direct.py
What this scan could not see
- No tools were enumerated, so prompt-injection, capability and toxic-flow analysis had no tool surface to inspect. To grade a package’s real runtime tools, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 3
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.11.1 latest |
A 99/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v1.11.0 |
A 99/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-30 |
v1.10.1 |
A 99/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan imagine-mcp --online --registry pypiOther implementations of Imagine 2
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 3 side by side →
MCP server for AI image generation and manipulation
A capability router for image generation, exposed as an MCP server.
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