Imagerelay MCP Server
imagerelay-mcp-server
npm
v2.0.4
Published by oliverames — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 11 = 89. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 15
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: ir_create_folder_link → ir_get_collection_files ⇒ ir_create_webhook. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink — and at least one leg is a direct schema wire (⇒), where a producer's output drops straight into a free-text parameter of the next tool, so the chain needs little agent cooperation. Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow ir_create_folder_link → ir_get_collection_files → ir_create_webhook
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/op-fallback.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/op-fallback.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ecFileSync } from "node:child_process"; /** * If the given env var is empty, attempt to resolve it from 1Password CLI.
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/op-fallback.js
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "ir_upload_file_from_url"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "ir_upload_file_from_url" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool ir_upload_file_from_url · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "ir_create_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "ir_create_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool ir_create_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "url" on "ir_update_webhook"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "ir_update_webhook" takes a URL/host parameter "url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool ir_update_webhook · inputSchema.properties.url
medium Tool "ir_move_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "ir_move_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "move_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool ir_move_file
medium Tool "ir_delete_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "ir_delete_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "delete_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool ir_delete_file
medium Tool "ir_create_file_version" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "ir_create_file_version" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "create_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool ir_create_file_version
low Mutating tool "ir_move_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ir_move_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ir_move_file
low Mutating tool "ir_delete_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ir_delete_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ir_delete_file
low Mutating tool "ir_create_file_version" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "ir_create_file_version" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool ir_create_file_version
low Unconstrained path parameter "file_type_id" on "ir_get_files"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "ir_get_files" takes a path parameter "file_type_id" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool ir_get_files · inputSchema.properties.file_type_id
low Unconstrained path parameter "file_id" on "ir_move_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "ir_move_file" takes a path parameter "file_id" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool ir_move_file · inputSchema.properties.file_id
low Unconstrained path parameter "file_id" on "ir_delete_file"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "ir_delete_file" takes a path parameter "file_id" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool ir_delete_file · inputSchema.properties.file_id
low Unconstrained path parameter "file_id" on "ir_create_file_version"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "ir_create_file_version" takes a path parameter "file_id" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool ir_create_file_version · inputSchema.properties.file_id
Tools 102
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ir_upload_file_from_urlingests untrusted inputnetwork egressir_create_file_versionwrites filesir_create_folder_linkingests untrusted inputir_create_quick_linkingests untrusted inputir_create_webhooknetwork egressir_delete_filewrites filesir_delete_webhooknetwork egressir_get_collection_filesreads sensitive datair_get_filesreads sensitive datair_get_supported_webhooksnetwork egress
Show 92 more tools ↓
ir_get_upload_linksnetwork egressir_get_webhooknetwork egressir_move_filewrites filesir_update_webhooknetwork egressir_add_dimension_optionno sensitive capabilityir_auth_statusno sensitive capabilityir_check_upload_job_statusno sensitive capabilityir_complete_file_versionno sensitive capabilityir_create_catalogno sensitive capabilityir_create_collectionno sensitive capabilityir_create_custom_attributeno sensitive capabilityir_create_dimensionno sensitive capabilityir_create_folderno sensitive capabilityir_create_keywordno sensitive capabilityir_create_keyword_setno sensitive capabilityir_create_productno sensitive capabilityir_create_sso_userno sensitive capabilityir_create_synced_fileno sensitive capabilityir_create_templateno sensitive capabilityir_create_upload_jobno sensitive capabilityir_create_upload_linkno sensitive capabilityir_create_variantno sensitive capabilityir_delete_catalogno sensitive capabilityir_delete_collectionno sensitive capabilityir_delete_folderno sensitive capabilityir_delete_folder_linkno sensitive capabilityir_delete_invited_userno sensitive capabilityir_delete_keywordno sensitive capabilityir_delete_productno sensitive capabilityir_delete_quick_linkno sensitive capabilityir_delete_upload_linkno sensitive capabilityir_delete_variantno sensitive capabilityir_duplicate_fileno sensitive capabilityir_get_catalogno sensitive capabilityir_get_catalog_productsno sensitive capabilityir_get_catalogsno sensitive capabilityir_get_categoriesno sensitive capabilityir_get_categoryno sensitive capabilityir_get_channel_template_mappingsno sensitive capabilityir_get_child_foldersno sensitive capabilityir_get_collectionno sensitive capabilityir_get_collectionsno sensitive capabilityir_get_custom_attributeno sensitive capabilityir_get_custom_attributesno sensitive capabilityir_get_dimensionno sensitive capabilityir_get_dimensionsno sensitive capabilityir_get_fileno sensitive capabilityir_get_file_typeno sensitive capabilityir_get_file_typesno sensitive capabilityir_get_folderno sensitive capabilityir_get_folder_linkno sensitive capabilityir_get_folder_linksno sensitive capabilityir_get_foldersno sensitive capabilityir_get_invited_userno sensitive capabilityir_get_invited_usersno sensitive capabilityir_get_keywordno sensitive capabilityir_get_keyword_setno sensitive capabilityir_get_keyword_setsno sensitive capabilityir_get_keywordsno sensitive capabilityir_get_meno sensitive capabilityir_get_permissionno sensitive capabilityir_get_permissionsno sensitive capabilityir_get_productno sensitive capabilityir_get_product_catalogno sensitive capabilityir_get_product_variantno sensitive capabilityir_get_product_variantsno sensitive capabilityir_get_productsno sensitive capabilityir_get_quick_linkno sensitive capabilityir_get_quick_linksno sensitive capabilityir_get_root_folderno sensitive capabilityir_get_templateno sensitive capabilityir_get_templatesno sensitive capabilityir_get_upload_linkno sensitive capabilityir_get_userno sensitive capabilityir_get_user_quick_linksno sensitive capabilityir_get_usersno sensitive capabilityir_get_webhooksno sensitive capabilityir_invite_userno sensitive capabilityir_search_usersno sensitive capabilityir_update_catalogno sensitive capabilityir_update_collectionno sensitive capabilityir_update_custom_attributeno sensitive capabilityir_update_dimensionno sensitive capabilityir_update_file_metadatano sensitive capabilityir_update_file_tagsno sensitive capabilityir_update_folderno sensitive capabilityir_update_keywordno sensitive capabilityir_update_keyword_setno sensitive capabilityir_update_productno sensitive capabilityir_update_templateno sensitive capabilityir_update_user_permissionno sensitive capabilityir_update_variantno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (102 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.0.4 latest |
B 89/100 | 15 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-24 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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