Browser (ikenga) MCP Server
@ikenga/mcp-browser
npm
v0.3.1
Source verified
Published by ikenga-hq — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Model Context Protocol (MCP) server that lets agents drive native child webviews in the Ikenga desktop app — open a pane on a partner portal (Spotify-for-Artists, Bandcamp, Linkfire, etc.), snapshot it, click, fill, and wait. Bypasses iframe CSP `frame-an
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Tool "browser_eval" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "browser_eval" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "eval" in tool name, parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool browser_eval
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script" on "browser_eval"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "browser_eval" takes a command-shaped parameter "script" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool browser_eval · inputSchema.properties.script
low Mutating tool "browser_eval" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "browser_eval" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool browser_eval
Tools 22
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
browser_evalruns code / shellbrowser_backno sensitive capabilitybrowser_clickno sensitive capabilitybrowser_closeno sensitive capabilitybrowser_fillno sensitive capabilitybrowser_focusno sensitive capabilitybrowser_forwardno sensitive capabilitybrowser_gotono sensitive capabilitybrowser_listno sensitive capabilitybrowser_openno sensitive capability
Show 12 more tools ↓
browser_pauseno sensitive capabilitybrowser_press_keyno sensitive capabilitybrowser_read_textno sensitive capabilitybrowser_reloadno sensitive capabilitybrowser_resumeno sensitive capabilitybrowser_screenshotno sensitive capabilitybrowser_selectno sensitive capabilitybrowser_session_createno sensitive capabilitybrowser_session_deleteno sensitive capabilitybrowser_session_listno sensitive capabilitybrowser_snapshotno sensitive capabilitybrowser_wait_forno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (22 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 2
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.3.1 latest |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.3.0 |
A 94/100 | 3 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-21 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @ikenga/mcp-browser --onlineOther implementations of Browser 24
Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 25 side by side →
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