Ig Trading MCP Server
ig-trading-mcp
npm
v1.0.0
Published by kea0811 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
IG Trading API with MCP (Model Context Protocol) server for AI integration
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Shell/command execution in server code (bin/cli.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`bin/cli.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; import path from 'path'; import { fileURLToPath } from 'url'; import fs from 'fs
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server bin/cli.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (test-mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`test-mcp.js:7`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from 'child_process'; console.log('Testing MCP Server...\n'); const mcp = spawn('node', ['src/servic
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server test-mcp.js
Tools 21
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ig_add_to_watchlistno sensitive capabilityig_close_all_positionsno sensitive capabilityig_close_positionno sensitive capabilityig_create_positionno sensitive capabilityig_create_watchlistno sensitive capabilityig_create_working_orderno sensitive capabilityig_delete_working_orderno sensitive capabilityig_get_account_activityno sensitive capabilityig_get_accountsno sensitive capabilityig_get_client_sentimentno sensitive capability
Show 11 more tools ↓
ig_get_historical_pricesno sensitive capabilityig_get_market_detailsno sensitive capabilityig_get_positionsno sensitive capabilityig_get_watchlistno sensitive capabilityig_get_watchlistsno sensitive capabilityig_get_working_ordersno sensitive capabilityig_loginno sensitive capabilityig_logoutno sensitive capabilityig_search_marketsno sensitive capabilityig_switch_accountno sensitive capabilityig_update_positionno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (21 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan ig-trading-mcp --onlineMore in Finance & Commerce
<img src="./public/logo.png" alt="1Money Logo" width="200"/>
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