Unity (iflow-mcp) MCP Server

@iflow-mcp/unity-mcp npm v1.0.0

Published by @iflow-mcp — no publish provenance and no vendor-owned scope, so the publisher could not be verified. The repository link below is self-declared.

Trust grade
C
75/100
Last scanned
Trust
C · 75/100
How safe the published surface and source look. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
C Why this grade 100 − 25.2 = 75/100

Every server starts at 100. These are the exact deductions the deterministic engine applied — each one reproducible, none of it an opinion or an LLM's guess:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−23.1 Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value ×2 MTC-SRC-010 injection
−2.1 Package has no source repository MTC-SUP-011 supply-chain

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind the deduction.

Findings 8

high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (dist/unity/MockUnityClient.js)MTC-SRC-010

In the server's implementation (`dist/unity/MockUnityClient.js:273`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eval(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/unity/MockUnityClient.js

high Dynamic evaluation of a non-literal value (src/unity/MockUnityClient.ts)MTC-SRC-010

In the server's implementation (`src/unity/MockUnityClient.ts:320`): Evaluating a runtime value as code (rather than a fixed literal) executes whatever reaches it — a direct RCE primitive, and almost never necessary in legitimate code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eval(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/unity/MockUnityClient.ts

high Dynamic code execution in server code (dist/unity/MockUnityClient.js)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`dist/unity/MockUnityClient.js:273`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eval(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/unity/MockUnityClient.js

high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/unity/MockUnityClient.ts)MTC-SRC-001

In the server's implementation (`src/unity/MockUnityClient.ts:320`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: eval(

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/unity/MockUnityClient.ts

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/dev/runner.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/dev/runner.js:40`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/dev/runner.js

high Shell/command execution in server code (src/dev/runner.ts)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`src/dev/runner.ts:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server src/dev/runner.ts

high Shell/command execution in server code (test-mcp-client.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`test-mcp-client.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: child_process

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server test-mcp-client.js

low Package has no source repositoryMTC-SUP-011

"@iflow-mcp/unity-mcp" declares no repository URL, so its published artifact cannot be compared against reviewable source.

Fix: Prefer packages that link to public, reviewable source.

Location: package @iflow-mcp/unity-mcp

What this scan could not see

Versions

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.0.0 latest C 75/100 8 1.5.0 2026-07-22

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MCP Trust Score: C · 75/100
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npx mcptrustchecker scan @iflow-mcp/unity-mcp --online

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