Storyblok (iflow-mcp) MCP Server

@iflow-mcp/storyblok-mcp npm v1.0.0

Published by @iflow-mcp — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.

MCP server for Storyblok integration

Trust grade
A
96/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 96/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
Share this Trust Score
𝕏 Share LinkedIn Reddit
A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 96/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 4 = 96. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−3 capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−1 publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([fetch_stories, fetch_tags, fetch_releases, fetch_assets, fetch_asset_folders, fetch_components, fetch_folders, fetch_datasources, fetch_datasource_entries, fetch_access_tokens, fetch_story_schedulings, fetch_presets, fetch_webhooks, fetch_component_folders, fetch_spaces, fetch_space_roles, fetch_workflows, fetch_workflow_stages, fetch_workflow_stage_changes, fetch_branches, fetch_branch_deployments]) co-exist with external-action tools ([create_webhook, update_webhook, delete_webhook]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [fetch_stories, fetch_tags, fetch_releases, fetch_assets, fetch_asset_folders, fetch_components, fetch_folders, fetch_datasources, fetch_datasource_en

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow fetch_stories → create_webhook

Tools 115

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • create_webhooknetwork egress
  • delete_webhooknetwork egress
  • fetch_access_tokensingests untrusted input
  • fetch_asset_foldersingests untrusted input
  • fetch_assetsingests untrusted input
  • fetch_branch_deploymentsingests untrusted input
  • fetch_branchesingests untrusted input
  • fetch_component_foldersingests untrusted input
  • fetch_componentsingests untrusted input
  • fetch_datasource_entriesingests untrusted input
Show 105 more tools ↓
  • fetch_datasourcesingests untrusted input
  • fetch_foldersingests untrusted input
  • fetch_presetsingests untrusted input
  • fetch_releasesingests untrusted input
  • fetch_space_rolesingests untrusted input
  • fetch_spacesingests untrusted input
  • fetch_storiesingests untrusted input
  • fetch_story_schedulingsingests untrusted input
  • fetch_tagsingests untrusted input
  • fetch_webhooksingests untrusted input
  • fetch_workflow_stage_changesingests untrusted input
  • fetch_workflow_stagesingests untrusted input
  • fetch_workflowsingests untrusted input
  • update_webhooknetwork egress
  • add_story_to_releaseno sensitive capability
  • auto_tag_storyno sensitive capability
  • backup_spaceno sensitive capability
  • compare_branchesno sensitive capability
  • complete_asset_uploadno sensitive capability
  • copy_stories_between_branchesno sensitive capability
  • create_access_tokenno sensitive capability
  • create_asset_folderno sensitive capability
  • create_branchno sensitive capability
  • create_branch_deploymentno sensitive capability
  • create_componentno sensitive capability
  • create_component_folderno sensitive capability
  • create_datasourceno sensitive capability
  • create_datasource_entryno sensitive capability
  • create_presetno sensitive capability
  • create_releaseno sensitive capability
  • create_spaceno sensitive capability
  • create_space_roleno sensitive capability
  • create_storyno sensitive capability
  • create_story_schedulingno sensitive capability
  • create_tagno sensitive capability
  • create_tag_and_add_to_storyno sensitive capability
  • create_workflowno sensitive capability
  • create_workflow_stageno sensitive capability
  • create_workflow_stage_changeno sensitive capability
  • delete_access_tokenno sensitive capability
  • delete_assetno sensitive capability
  • delete_asset_folderno sensitive capability
  • delete_branchno sensitive capability
  • delete_componentno sensitive capability
  • delete_component_folderno sensitive capability
  • delete_datasourceno sensitive capability
  • delete_datasource_entryno sensitive capability
  • delete_presetno sensitive capability
  • delete_releaseno sensitive capability
  • delete_spaceno sensitive capability
  • delete_space_roleno sensitive capability
  • delete_storyno sensitive capability
  • delete_story_schedulingno sensitive capability
  • delete_tagno sensitive capability
  • delete_workflowno sensitive capability
  • delete_workflow_stageno sensitive capability
  • deploy_branchno sensitive capability
  • duplicate_spaceno sensitive capability
  • duplicate_workflowno sensitive capability
  • generate_altno sensitive capability
  • generate_metano sensitive capability
  • get_access_tokenno sensitive capability
  • get_assetno sensitive capability
  • get_branchno sensitive capability
  • get_branch_deploymentno sensitive capability
  • get_branch_storiesno sensitive capability
  • get_componentno sensitive capability
  • get_component_folderno sensitive capability
  • get_datasourceno sensitive capability
  • get_datasource_entryno sensitive capability
  • get_presetno sensitive capability
  • get_spaceno sensitive capability
  • get_space_roleno sensitive capability
  • get_storyno sensitive capability
  • get_story_by_slugno sensitive capability
  • get_story_schedulingno sensitive capability
  • get_story_versionsno sensitive capability
  • get_webhookno sensitive capability
  • get_workflowno sensitive capability
  • get_workflow_stageno sensitive capability
  • get_workflow_stage_changeno sensitive capability
  • import_storyno sensitive capability
  • init_asset_uploadno sensitive capability
  • pingno sensitive capability
  • publish_releaseno sensitive capability
  • publish_storyno sensitive capability
  • restore_storyno sensitive capability
  • search_storiesno sensitive capability
  • translate_storyno sensitive capability
  • unpublish_storyno sensitive capability
  • update_access_tokenno sensitive capability
  • update_asset_folderno sensitive capability
  • update_branchno sensitive capability
  • update_componentno sensitive capability
  • update_component_folderno sensitive capability
  • update_datasourceno sensitive capability
  • update_datasource_entryno sensitive capability
  • update_presetno sensitive capability
  • update_releaseno sensitive capability
  • update_spaceno sensitive capability
  • update_space_roleno sensitive capability
  • update_storyno sensitive capability
  • update_story_schedulingno sensitive capability
  • update_workflowno sensitive capability
  • update_workflow_stageno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.0.0 latest A 96/100 1 1.13.0 2026-09-07

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 96/100
Markdown (GitHub README)
[![MCP Trust Score](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/iflow-mcp-storyblok-mcp/badge.svg)](https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/iflow-mcp-storyblok-mcp)
HTML
<a href="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/iflow-mcp-storyblok-mcp"><img src="https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/iflow-mcp-storyblok-mcp/badge.svg" alt="MCP Trust Score" height="20"></a>
Prefer shields.io styling? Point it at https://mcptrustchecker.com/registry/iflow-mcp-storyblok-mcp/badge.json via https://img.shields.io/endpoint?url=…

Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan @iflow-mcp/storyblok-mcp --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

Other implementations of Storyblok 1

Independent packages implementing the same tool, scanned with the same engine. Compare all 2 side by side →

More in Content Management