Idea Manager — the complete, unedited output of the deterministic mcptrustchecker engine v1.13.0, scanned . Every finding, capability tag and score component below is exactly what the engine produced — no AI, no post-processing.
{
"tool": {
"name": "mcptrustchecker",
"version": "1.13.0",
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"target": {
"id": "idea-manager",
"source": {
"kind": "package",
"origin": "idea-manager"
},
"server": {
"name": "idea-manager"
}
},
"grade": "A",
"score": {
"score": 92,
"threatScore": 99,
"grade": "A",
"band": "A",
"categorySubtotals": {
"injection": 0,
"exfiltration": 0,
"permissions": 0,
"supply-chain": 1.2,
"network": 0,
"hygiene": 0
},
"vector": [
{
"kind": "threat",
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"rawWeight": 3,
"confidenceMult": 0.4,
"diminishingFactor": 1,
"appliedPenalty": 1.2
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "capability-exposure",
"level": "high",
"label": "capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated",
"appliedPenalty": 6
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "verification-discount",
"level": "repo",
"label": "publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable",
"appliedPenalty": 1
},
{
"kind": "client",
"term": "coverage-honesty",
"level": "source",
"label": "inspection depth (source) — how much of the target the scan could see",
"appliedPenalty": 0
}
],
"gatesFired": [],
"methodologyVersion": "mcptrustchecker-1.13"
},
"capability": {
"level": "high",
"reasons": [
"can send data / act on an external service",
"can execute shell commands or code"
],
"tags": [
"external-sink",
"code-exec"
]
},
"coverage": {
"level": "source",
"inputs": {
"toolSurface": true,
"implementationSource": true,
"packageMetadata": true,
"liveTransport": false
},
"caveats": [
"Tools were statically extracted from the published source (7 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command \"npx -y <package>\"."
]
},
"findings": [
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (.next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/advisor-actions/route.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`.next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/advisor-actions/route.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": ".next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/advisor-actions/route.js"
},
"evidence": "a.exports=require(\"node:child_process\")},1820:a=>{a.exports=require(\"os\")},3033:a=>{a.exports=require(\"next/dist/server/",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": ".next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/advisor-actions/route.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (.next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/archive/route.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`.next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/archive/route.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": ".next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/archive/route.js"
},
"evidence": "a.exports=require(\"node:child_process\")},1820:a=>{a.exports=require(\"os\")},3033:a=>{a.exports=require(\"next/dist/server/",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": ".next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/archive/route.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (.next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/global-advisor/route.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`.next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/global-advisor/route.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": ".next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/global-advisor/route.js"
},
"evidence": "a.exports=require(\"node:child_process\")},1820:a=>{a.exports=require(\"os\")},3033:a=>{a.exports=require(\"next/dist/server/",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": ".next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/global-advisor/route.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (.next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/global-memo/route.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`.next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/global-memo/route.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": ".next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/global-memo/route.js"
},
"evidence": "a.exports=require(\"node:child_process\")},1799:(a,b,c)=>{\"use strict\";c.d(b,{bE:()=>m,sA:()=>k});var d=c(3873),e=c.n(d),f",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": ".next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/global-memo/route.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (.next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/maintenance/route.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`.next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/maintenance/route.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": ".next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/maintenance/route.js"
},
"evidence": "a.exports=require(\"node:child_process\")},1799:(a,b,c)=>{\"use strict\";c.d(b,{bE:()=>m,sA:()=>k});var d=c(3873),e=c.n(d),f",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": ".next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/maintenance/route.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (.next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/projects/[id]/advisor/route.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`.next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/projects/[id]/advisor/route.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": ".next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/projects/[id]/advisor/route.js"
},
"evidence": "a.exports=require(\"node:child_process\")},1820:a=>{a.exports=require(\"os\")},3033:a=>{a.exports=require(\"next/dist/server/",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": ".next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/projects/[id]/advisor/route.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (.next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/projects/[id]/apply-distribute/route.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`.next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/projects/[id]/apply-distribute/route.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": ".next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/projects/[id]/apply-distribute/route.js"
},
"evidence": "a.exports=require(\"node:child_process\")},1820:a=>{a.exports=require(\"os\")},3033:a=>{a.exports=require(\"next/dist/server/",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": ".next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/projects/[id]/apply-distribute/route.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (.next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/projects/[id]/auto-distribute/route.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`.next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/projects/[id]/auto-distribute/route.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": ".next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/projects/[id]/auto-distribute/route.js"
},
"evidence": "a.exports=require(\"node:child_process\")},1820:a=>{a.exports=require(\"os\")},3033:a=>{a.exports=require(\"next/dist/server/",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": ".next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/projects/[id]/auto-distribute/route.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (.next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/projects/[id]/brainstorm/route.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`.next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/projects/[id]/brainstorm/route.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": ".next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/projects/[id]/brainstorm/route.js"
},
"evidence": "a.exports=require(\"node:child_process\")},1820:a=>{a.exports=require(\"os\")},3033:a=>{a.exports=require(\"next/dist/server/",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": ".next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/projects/[id]/brainstorm/route.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-002",
"title": "Shell/command execution in server code (.next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/projects/[id]/distribution-history/[historyId]/rollback/route.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "high",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`.next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/projects/[id]/distribution-history/[historyId]/rollback/route.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": ".next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/projects/[id]/distribution-history/[historyId]/rollback/route.js"
},
"evidence": "a.exports=require(\"node:child_process\")},1820:a=>{a.exports=require(\"os\")},3033:a=>{a.exports=require(\"next/dist/server/",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-002",
"file": ".next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/projects/[id]/distribution-history/[historyId]/rollback/route.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (.next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/version/route.js)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`.next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/version/route.js:1`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": ".next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/version/route.js"
},
"evidence": ">a.abort(),5e3),c=await fetch(\"https://registry.npmjs.org/idea-manager/latest\",{signal:a.signal,cache:\"no-store\"});if(cl",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": ".next/standalone/.next/server/app/api/version/route.js",
"line": 1,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/app/api/version/route.ts)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/app/api/version/route.ts:52`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/app/api/version/route.ts"
},
"evidence": "; const res = await fetch('https://registry.npmjs.org/idea-manager/latest', { signal: controller.signal,",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/app/api/version/route.ts",
"line": 52,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-003",
"title": "Hardcoded egress to an external endpoint (src/lib/auto-update.ts)",
"category": "exfiltration",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "strong",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`src/lib/auto-update.ts:30`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": "src/lib/auto-update.ts"
},
"evidence": "; const res = await fetch('https://registry.npmjs.org/idea-manager/latest', { signal: controller.signal, }",
"owasp": "LLM02:2025 Sensitive Information Disclosure",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-003",
"file": "src/lib/auto-update.ts",
"line": 30,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SRC-005",
"title": "Dynamic module load from a non-literal (.next/standalone/.next/static/chunks/main-6403adb647c341df.js)",
"category": "permissions",
"severity": "medium",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "In the server's implementation (`.next/standalone/.next/static/chunks/main-6403adb647c341df.js:5`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.",
"remediation": "Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.",
"location": {
"kind": "server",
"name": ".next/standalone/.next/static/chunks/main-6403adb647c341df.js"
},
"evidence": "bitArray:this.bitArray}}import(e){this.numItems=e.numItems,this.errorRate=e.errorRate,this.numBits=e.numBits,this.numHas",
"owasp": "LLM05:2025 Improper Output Handling",
"data": {
"rule": "MTC-SRC-005",
"file": ".next/standalone/.next/static/chunks/main-6403adb647c341df.js",
"line": 5,
"nonRuntime": false
}
},
{
"ruleId": "MTC-SUP-010",
"title": "Package runs install-time scripts (postinstall)",
"category": "supply-chain",
"severity": "low",
"confidence": "heuristic",
"description": "\"idea-manager\" executes postinstall script(s) at install time. An install hook runs at install time; most are routine build/setup, but review what it does before trusting it.",
"remediation": "Review the scripts; install with --ignore-scripts where possible and vet what they do.",
"location": {
"kind": "package",
"name": "idea-manager"
},
"evidence": "node bin/postinstall.js",
"owasp": "LLM03:2025 Supply Chain",
"references": [
"https://github.com/ossf/package-analysis",
"https://owasp.org/www-project-top-10-ci-cd-security-risks/"
],
"data": {
"scripts": [
"postinstall"
]
}
}
],
"toxicFlows": [],
"capabilities": [
{
"tool": "list-projects",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-project-context",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-next-task",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "get-task-prompt",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "update-status",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "report-completion",
"tags": [],
"reasons": {}
},
{
"tool": "export-to-timo",
"tags": [
"external-sink"
],
"reasons": {
"external-sink": [
"keyword \"export_to\""
]
}
}
],
"surfaceDigest": "9d69113f1da72be2b3f9a629497041ce81e62b874e5035703011aa2cd700fe4d",
"stats": {
"tools": 7,
"prompts": 0,
"resources": 0,
"findingsBySeverity": {
"critical": 0,
"high": 10,
"medium": 4,
"low": 1,
"info": 0
}
}
}