Idamesh MCP Server
idamesh
PyPI
v1.0.0
Published by jordanro2 — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 3
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/idamesh/bootstrap/plugin_main.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/idamesh/bootstrap/plugin_main.py:311`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ession"] = True subprocess.Popen(argv, **popen_kwargs) # noqa: S603 — detached singleton def PLUGIN_ENTRY():
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/idamesh/bootstrap/plugin_main.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/idamesh/infrastructure/process/worker_pool.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/idamesh/infrastructure/process/worker_pool.py:373`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: : process = subprocess.Popen(argv, **popen_kwargs) # noqa: S603 except OSError as exc:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/idamesh/infrastructure/process/worker_pool.py
medium Dynamic module load from a non-literal (src/idamesh/infrastructure/ida/execute_sync.py)MTC-SRC-005
In the server's implementation (`src/idamesh/infrastructure/ida/execute_sync.py:88`): Loading a module chosen at runtime (from a variable) can pull in and run attacker-influenced code paths. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: module = __import__(module_name) return bool(module.is_main_thread()) except
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/idamesh/infrastructure/ida/execute_sync.py
Tools 42
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
analyze_functioningests untrusted inputanalyze_componentno sensitive capabilitybasic_blocksno sensitive capabilitycalleesno sensitive capabilitycallgraphno sensitive capabilitydecompileno sensitive capabilitydetect_stack_stringsno sensitive capabilitydetect_vulnsno sensitive capabilitydisasmno sensitive capabilityentity_queryno sensitive capability
Show 32 more tools ↓
export_annotationsno sensitive capabilityexport_funcsno sensitive capabilityfind_bytesno sensitive capabilityfind_cryptono sensitive capabilityfind_dangerous_callersno sensitive capabilityfind_regexno sensitive capabilityfunc_profileno sensitive capabilityfunc_queryno sensitive capabilityget_bytesno sensitive capabilityget_global_valueno sensitive capabilityget_intno sensitive capabilityget_metadatano sensitive capabilityget_stringno sensitive capabilityimportsno sensitive capabilityimports_queryno sensitive capabilityinsn_queryno sensitive capabilityint_convertno sensitive capabilitylist_funcsno sensitive capabilitylist_globalsno sensitive capabilitylist_stringsno sensitive capabilitylookup_funcsno sensitive capabilityread_structno sensitive capabilitysearch_structsno sensitive capabilitysearch_textno sensitive capabilityserver_healthno sensitive capabilitysurvey_binaryno sensitive capabilitytrace_data_flowno sensitive capabilitytrace_source_to_sinkno sensitive capabilitytype_inspectno sensitive capabilitytype_queryno sensitive capabilityxref_queryno sensitive capabilityxrefs_tono sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (42 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 3 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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