Ida Pro MCP Server
ida-pro-mcp
PyPI
v1.4.0
Published by mrexodia — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
Vibe reversing with IDA Pro
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 2
high Dynamic code execution in server code (src/ida_pro_mcp/server.py)MTC-SRC-001
In the server's implementation (`src/ida_pro_mcp/server.py:197`): Evaluating strings as code is the most direct RCE primitive; if any tool input reaches it, the server executes attacker-chosen code. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ys.stderr, flush=True) exec(compile(code, GENERATED_PY, "exec")) MCP_FUNCTIONS = ["check_connection"] + list(visitor.f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ida_pro_mcp/server.py
high Shell/command execution in server code (src/ida_pro_mcp/server.py)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`src/ida_pro_mcp/server.py:197`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: ys.stderr, flush=True) exec(compile(code, GENERATED_PY, "exec")) MCP_FUNCTIONS = ["check_connection"] + list(visitor.f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/ida_pro_mcp/server.py
Tools 60
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
analyze_struct_detailedno sensitive capabilitycheck_connectionno sensitive capabilityconvert_numberno sensitive capabilitycreate_stack_frame_variableno sensitive capabilitydata_read_byteno sensitive capabilitydata_read_dwordno sensitive capabilitydata_read_qwordno sensitive capabilitydata_read_stringno sensitive capabilitydata_read_wordno sensitive capabilitydbg_continue_processno sensitive capability
Show 50 more tools ↓
dbg_delete_breakpointno sensitive capabilitydbg_enable_breakpointno sensitive capabilitydbg_exit_processno sensitive capabilitydbg_get_call_stackno sensitive capabilitydbg_get_registersno sensitive capabilitydbg_list_breakpointsno sensitive capabilitydbg_run_tono sensitive capabilitydbg_set_breakpointno sensitive capabilitydbg_start_processno sensitive capabilitydbg_step_intono sensitive capabilitydbg_step_overno sensitive capabilitydeclare_c_typeno sensitive capabilitydecompile_functionno sensitive capabilitydelete_stack_frame_variableno sensitive capabilitydisassemble_functionno sensitive capabilityget_calleesno sensitive capabilityget_callersno sensitive capabilityget_current_addressno sensitive capabilityget_current_functionno sensitive capabilityget_defined_structuresno sensitive capabilityget_entry_pointsno sensitive capabilityget_function_by_addressno sensitive capabilityget_function_by_nameno sensitive capabilityget_global_variable_value_at_addressno sensitive capabilityget_global_variable_value_by_nameno sensitive capabilityget_metadatano sensitive capabilityget_stack_frame_variablesno sensitive capabilityget_struct_at_addressno sensitive capabilityget_struct_info_simpleno sensitive capabilityget_xrefs_tono sensitive capabilityget_xrefs_to_fieldno sensitive capabilitylist_functionsno sensitive capabilitylist_globalsno sensitive capabilitylist_globals_filterno sensitive capabilitylist_importsno sensitive capabilitylist_local_typesno sensitive capabilitylist_stringsno sensitive capabilitylist_strings_filterno sensitive capabilitypatch_address_assemblesno sensitive capabilityread_memory_bytesno sensitive capabilityrename_functionno sensitive capabilityrename_global_variableno sensitive capabilityrename_local_variableno sensitive capabilityrename_stack_frame_variableno sensitive capabilitysearch_structuresno sensitive capabilityset_commentno sensitive capabilityset_function_prototypeno sensitive capabilityset_global_variable_typeno sensitive capabilityset_local_variable_typeno sensitive capabilityset_stack_frame_variable_typeno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (60 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.4.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-08-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan ida-pro-mcp --online --registry pypiMore in Security & Testing
The Stripe Agent Toolkit enables popular agent frameworks including LangChain and Vercel's AI SDK to integrate with Stripe APIs through function calling.
MCP (Model Context Protocol) server for AgentGate. Enables Claude and other MCP-compatible AI assistants to request approvals.
Scan any website for AI agent readiness, payment protocols, and discovery endpoints
MCP server for aigently security guardrails — reads static catalog-data JSON, zero API dependency
Governed threat modeling, code threat verification, traceability & compliance, as MCP tools.
Governed threat modeling, code threat verification, traceability & compliance, as MCP tools.