Iconnect MCP Server
iconnect-mcp
npm
v0.1.1
Source verified
Published by heznpc — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 10 = 84. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −10 | capability blast radius (critical) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
critical Completed toxic-flow trifecta across toolsMTC-FLOW-002
This server (without client built-ins) exposes a complete data-exfiltration chain: get_unread_count → list_directory → send_file. Untrusted input is ingested, private data is read, and it can be sent to an external sink via the agent composing the tools (→). Static analysis proves the primitive exists, not that a specific run will occur.
Fix: Remove one leg of the trifecta: isolate untrusted-input tools from secret-reading tools and from egress tools, or require human approval between them.
Location: flow get_unread_count → list_directory → send_file
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/cli/doctor.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/doctor.js:9`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execSync } from "node:child_process"; import { MODULE_NAMES, STARTER_MODULES, NPM_PACKAGE_NAME } from "../shared/confi
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/doctor.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/shared/jxa.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/shared/jxa.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFile } from "node:child_process"; import { promisify } from "node:util"; const execFileAsync = promisify(execFile)
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/shared/jxa.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/shared/swift.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/shared/swift.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt { spawn } from "node:child_process"; import { access } from "node:fs/promises"; import { resolve, dirname } from "nod
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/shared/swift.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/cli/doctor.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli/doctor.js:117`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: try { execSync(`osascript -l JavaScript -e "Application('${appName}'); JSON.stringify({ok:true})"`, {
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli/doctor.js
medium Tool "move_file" can modify the filesystemMTC-CAP-002
Tool "move_file" can write, overwrite or delete files (keyword "move_file" in tool name). Verify it is scoped to a safe directory.
Fix: Constrain file operations to an explicit, non-sensitive root; reject path traversal.
Location: tool move_file
low Mutating tool "move_file" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "move_file" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool move_file
low Unconstrained path parameter "path" on "list_directory"MTC-CAP-008
Tool "list_directory" takes a path parameter "path" with no constraint. Without a canonicalize-and-contain check (not visible statically), this permits ../ traversal outside the intended root.
Fix: Resolve and verify the path stays within an allowed root; reject traversal sequences.
Location: tool list_directory · inputSchema.properties.path
Tools 124
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
get_unread_countingests untrusted inputlist_directoryreads sensitive datamove_filewrites filesread_messageingests untrusted inputsend_filenetwork egresssend_messagenetwork egressactivate_tabno sensitive capabilityadd_contact_emailno sensitive capabilityadd_contact_phoneno sensitive capabilityadd_to_albumno sensitive capability
Show 114 more tools ↓
bulk_move_notesno sensitive capabilitycapture_screenshotno sensitive capabilityclose_tabno sensitive capabilitycompare_notesno sensitive capabilitycomplete_reminderno sensitive capabilitycreate_albumno sensitive capabilitycreate_contactno sensitive capabilitycreate_directoryno sensitive capabilitycreate_eventno sensitive capabilitycreate_folderno sensitive capabilitycreate_noteno sensitive capabilitycreate_recurring_eventno sensitive capabilitycreate_recurring_reminderno sensitive capabilitycreate_reminderno sensitive capabilitycreate_reminder_listno sensitive capabilitydelete_contactno sensitive capabilitydelete_eventno sensitive capabilitydelete_noteno sensitive capabilitydelete_photosno sensitive capabilitydelete_reminderno sensitive capabilitydelete_reminder_listno sensitive capabilityfind_relatedno sensitive capabilityflag_messageno sensitive capabilityget_clipboardno sensitive capabilityget_current_tabno sensitive capabilityget_file_infono sensitive capabilityget_frontmost_appno sensitive capabilityget_photo_infono sensitive capabilityget_screen_infono sensitive capabilityget_shortcut_detailno sensitive capabilityget_track_infono sensitive capabilityget_upcoming_eventsno sensitive capabilityget_volumeno sensitive capabilityget_workflowno sensitive capabilityimport_photono sensitive capabilitylist_accountsno sensitive capabilitylist_albumsno sensitive capabilitylist_calendarsno sensitive capabilitylist_chatsno sensitive capabilitylist_contactsno sensitive capabilitylist_eventsno sensitive capabilitylist_favoritesno sensitive capabilitylist_foldersno sensitive capabilitylist_group_membersno sensitive capabilitylist_groupsno sensitive capabilitylist_mailboxesno sensitive capabilitylist_messagesno sensitive capabilitylist_notesno sensitive capabilitylist_participantsno sensitive capabilitylist_photosno sensitive capabilitylist_playlistsno sensitive capabilitylist_reminder_listsno sensitive capabilitylist_remindersno sensitive capabilitylist_running_appsno sensitive capabilitylist_shortcutsno sensitive capabilitylist_tabsno sensitive capabilitylist_tracksno sensitive capabilitymark_message_readno sensitive capabilitymove_messageno sensitive capabilitymove_noteno sensitive capabilitynow_playingno sensitive capabilityopen_urlno sensitive capabilityplay_playlistno sensitive capabilityplay_trackno sensitive capabilityplayback_controlno sensitive capabilityproofread_textno sensitive capabilityread_chatno sensitive capabilityread_contactno sensitive capabilityread_eventno sensitive capabilityread_noteno sensitive capabilityread_page_contentno sensitive capabilityread_reminderno sensitive capabilityrecent_filesno sensitive capabilityreply_mailno sensitive capabilityrewrite_textno sensitive capabilityrun_javascriptno sensitive capabilityrun_shortcutno sensitive capabilityscan_notesno sensitive capabilitysearch_chatsno sensitive capabilitysearch_contactsno sensitive capabilitysearch_eventsno sensitive capabilitysearch_filesno sensitive capabilitysearch_messagesno sensitive capabilitysearch_notesno sensitive capabilitysearch_photosno sensitive capabilitysearch_remindersno sensitive capabilitysearch_shortcutsno sensitive capabilitysearch_tabsno sensitive capabilitysearch_tracksno sensitive capabilitysemantic_indexno sensitive capabilitysemantic_searchno sensitive capabilitysemantic_statusno sensitive capabilitysend_mailno sensitive capabilityset_clipboardno sensitive capabilityset_file_tagsno sensitive capabilityset_shuffleno sensitive capabilityset_volumeno sensitive capabilitysetup_permissionsno sensitive capabilityshow_notificationno sensitive capabilitysummarize_contextno sensitive capabilitysummarize_textno sensitive capabilitytoday_eventsno sensitive capabilitytoggle_dark_modeno sensitive capabilitytrash_fileno sensitive capabilitytv_list_playlistsno sensitive capabilitytv_list_tracksno sensitive capabilitytv_now_playingno sensitive capabilitytv_playno sensitive capabilitytv_playback_controlno sensitive capabilitytv_searchno sensitive capabilityupdate_contactno sensitive capabilityupdate_eventno sensitive capabilityupdate_noteno sensitive capabilityupdate_reminderno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (124 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.1.1 latest |
B 84/100 | 8 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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