Icloud (npm) MCP Server

icloud-mcp npm v2.5.1

Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for iCloud Mail

Trust grade
A
95/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
A · 95/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
Moderate
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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A Why this grade threat 100 − adoption risk = 95/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:

The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.

2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 5 = 95. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−3 capability blast radius (moderate) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−2 publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 1

medium Untrusted input can drive an external actionMTC-FLOW-005

Untrusted-input tools ([get_unread_senders, read_inbox, get_attachment, mark_older_than_read, suggest_event_from_email]) co-exist with external-action tools ([forward_email]). A prompt injection could cause unwanted external actions, though no direct sensitive-data leak path was found.

Evidence: untrusted [get_unread_senders, read_inbox, get_attachment, mark_older_than_read, suggest_event_from_email] → sinks [forward_email]

Fix: Require confirmation for state-changing/egress actions triggered after processing untrusted content.

Location: flow get_unread_senders → forward_email

Tools 70

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • forward_emailnetwork egress
  • get_attachmentingests untrusted input
  • get_unread_sendersingests untrusted input
  • mark_older_than_readingests untrusted input
  • read_inboxingests untrusted input
  • suggest_event_from_emailingests untrusted input
  • abandon_moveno sensitive capability
  • archive_older_thanno sensitive capability
  • bulk_deleteno sensitive capability
  • bulk_delete_by_senderno sensitive capability
Show 60 more tools ↓
  • bulk_delete_by_subjectno sensitive capability
  • bulk_flagno sensitive capability
  • bulk_flag_by_senderno sensitive capability
  • bulk_mark_readno sensitive capability
  • bulk_mark_unreadno sensitive capability
  • bulk_moveno sensitive capability
  • bulk_move_by_domainno sensitive capability
  • bulk_move_by_senderno sensitive capability
  • compose_emailno sensitive capability
  • count_emailsno sensitive capability
  • create_contactno sensitive capability
  • create_eventno sensitive capability
  • create_mailboxno sensitive capability
  • create_ruleno sensitive capability
  • delete_contactno sensitive capability
  • delete_emailno sensitive capability
  • delete_eventno sensitive capability
  • delete_mailboxno sensitive capability
  • delete_older_thanno sensitive capability
  • delete_ruleno sensitive capability
  • empty_trashno sensitive capability
  • flag_emailno sensitive capability
  • get_contactno sensitive capability
  • get_digest_stateno sensitive capability
  • get_emailno sensitive capability
  • get_email_rawno sensitive capability
  • get_emails_by_date_rangeno sensitive capability
  • get_emails_by_senderno sensitive capability
  • get_eventno sensitive capability
  • get_inbox_summaryno sensitive capability
  • get_mailbox_summaryno sensitive capability
  • get_move_statusno sensitive capability
  • get_storage_reportno sensitive capability
  • get_threadno sensitive capability
  • get_top_sendersno sensitive capability
  • get_unsubscribe_infono sensitive capability
  • icloud-mailno sensitive capability
  • list_accountsno sensitive capability
  • list_attachmentsno sensitive capability
  • list_calendarsno sensitive capability
  • list_contactsno sensitive capability
  • list_eventsno sensitive capability
  • list_mailboxesno sensitive capability
  • list_rulesno sensitive capability
  • log_clearno sensitive capability
  • log_readno sensitive capability
  • log_writeno sensitive capability
  • mark_as_readno sensitive capability
  • move_emailno sensitive capability
  • rename_mailboxno sensitive capability
  • reply_to_emailno sensitive capability
  • run_all_rulesno sensitive capability
  • run_ruleno sensitive capability
  • save_draftno sensitive capability
  • search_contactsno sensitive capability
  • search_emailsno sensitive capability
  • search_eventsno sensitive capability
  • update_contactno sensitive capability
  • update_digest_stateno sensitive capability
  • update_eventno sensitive capability

Toxic flows 1

Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v2.5.1 latest A 95/100 1 1.13.0 2026-09-07

Embed this score

Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.

MCP Trust Score: A · 95/100
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Verify this score yourself

The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.

npx mcptrustchecker scan icloud-mcp --online

Use the free API → How scoring works

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