ice-puzzle-mcp
npm
v1.1.2
Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.
MCP plugin for building, testing, and publishing ice puzzle levels with AI
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 8 = 86. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −2 | publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`dist/setup/codex-cli.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'fs'; import { homedir } from 'os'; import { join } f
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/setup/codex-cli.js
In the server's implementation (`dist/setup/index.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: c, execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { join } from 'path'; import { homedir } from 'os'; import { DEFAULT_EXCH
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/setup/index.js
In the server's implementation (`dist/setup/uninstall.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: c, execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, rmSync, chmodSync } from 'fs';
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/setup/uninstall.js
In the server's implementation (`dist/setup/uninstall.js:10`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: nd) { try { execSync(`${command} --version`, { stdio: 'pipe', timeout: 5000 }); return true; }
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/setup/uninstall.js
In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/setup/codex-cli.test.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'fs'; import { homedir } from 'os'; import { formatCo
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/setup/codex-cli.test.js
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
add_pushable_rockno sensitive capabilityadd_thin_iceno sensitive capabilityadd_warp_pairno sensitive capabilityanalyze_difficultyno sensitive capabilityauth_statusno sensitive capabilitybuild-levelno sensitive capabilityCampaign Examplesno sensitive capabilitychallenge-levelno sensitive capabilitycheck_publish_readinessno sensitive capabilityclear_levelno sensitive capabilityclear_regionno sensitive capabilitycreate_levelno sensitive capabilityCurrent Levelno sensitive capabilitydelete_draftno sensitive capabilitydelete_remote_draftno sensitive capabilityexport_levelno sensitive capabilityfill_regionno sensitive capabilityGame Rulesno sensitive capabilityget_campaign_exampleno sensitive capabilityget_game_rulesno sensitive capabilityget_levelno sensitive capabilityget_level_requirementsno sensitive capabilityget_my_published_levelno sensitive capabilityget_tile_typesno sensitive capabilitygridSizeno sensitive capabilityimport_levelno sensitive capabilityimprove-levelno sensitive capabilityinteraction_faqno sensitive capabilitylist_campaign_examplesno sensitive capabilitylist_draftsno sensitive capabilitylist_my_published_levelsno sensitive capabilitylist_remote_draftsno sensitive capabilityload_draftno sensitive capabilityload_local_draftno sensitive capabilitymechanicsno sensitive capabilitymove_tileno sensitive capabilityplace_tileno sensitive capabilityplace_tiles_batchno sensitive capabilitypreview_levelno sensitive capabilitypublish_levelno sensitive capabilityreachable_fromno sensitive capabilityredono sensitive capabilityremove_barrierno sensitive capabilityremove_pressure_plateno sensitive capabilityremove_pushable_rockno sensitive capabilityremove_thin_iceno sensitive capabilityremove_tileno sensitive capabilityremove_warpno sensitive capabilityrename_levelno sensitive capabilityrestore_published_levelno sensitive capabilityrevert_to_last_solvableno sensitive capabilitysave_draftno sensitive capabilitysave_local_draftno sensitive capabilityseed_layout_patternno sensitive capabilityset_barrierno sensitive capabilityset_goalno sensitive capabilityset_grid_sizeno sensitive capabilityset_parno sensitive capabilityset_par_to_shortestno sensitive capabilityset_pressure_plateno sensitive capabilityset_startno sensitive capabilitysimulate_moveno sensitive capabilitysimulate_playthroughno sensitive capabilitysolve_levelno sensitive capabilitysuggest_skeleton_layoutno sensitive capabilitysuggest_stop_pointsno sensitive capabilitytargetMovesno sensitive capabilitytest_placementno sensitive capabilityTile Typesno sensitive capabilityundono sensitive capabilityunpublish_levelno sensitive capabilityvalidate_quality_gateno sensitive capabilityvisualize_levelno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.1.2 latest |
B 86/100 | 5 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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