Ice Puzzle MCP Server

ice-puzzle-mcp npm v1.1.2

Published by an unidentified publisher — no publish provenance and no public repository, so the publisher could not be verified and the source cannot be independently located.

MCP plugin for building, testing, and publishing ice puzzle levels with AI

Trust grade
B
86/100
Last scanned get badge →
Trust
B · 86/100
Adoption risk for you: the threat score, then adjusted down for blast radius, publisher verification and how much the scan could see. Deterministic; every point is auditable.
Capability
High
Blast radius if it went rogue — what the server’s tools could reach. Independent of trust.
Coverage
Source
How much the scan could actually inspect. Shallow coverage is stated, never hidden.
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B Why this grade threat 94 − adoption risk = 86/100

The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.

1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:

PointsWhat was foundCategory
−6.3 Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 injection

2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 8 = 86. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:

PointsAdoption-risk factor
−6 capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated
−2 publisher verification (unlinked) — no provenance/repo link, but the shipped source was fully read

Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored. Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.

Findings 5

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/setup/codex-cli.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/setup/codex-cli.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'fs'; import { homedir } from 'os'; import { join } f

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/setup/codex-cli.js

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/setup/index.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/setup/index.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: c, execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { join } from 'path'; import { homedir } from 'os'; import { DEFAULT_EXCH

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/setup/index.js

high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/setup/uninstall.js)MTC-SRC-002

In the server's implementation (`dist/setup/uninstall.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: c, execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync, readFileSync, writeFileSync, rmSync, chmodSync } from 'fs';

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/setup/uninstall.js

medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/setup/uninstall.js)MTC-SRC-009

In the server's implementation (`dist/setup/uninstall.js:10`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: nd) { try { execSync(`${command} --version`, { stdio: 'pipe', timeout: 5000 }); return true; }

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/setup/uninstall.js

low Shell/command execution in packaging/dev tooling (dist/setup/codex-cli.test.js)MTC-SRC-002

In a packaging/dev/install script (shipped, but not the server runtime) (`dist/setup/codex-cli.test.js:2`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.

Evidence: { execFileSync } from 'child_process'; import { existsSync } from 'fs'; import { homedir } from 'os'; import { formatCo

Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.

Location: server dist/setup/codex-cli.test.js

Tools 73

Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.

  • add_pushable_rockno sensitive capability
  • add_thin_iceno sensitive capability
  • add_warp_pairno sensitive capability
  • analyze_difficultyno sensitive capability
  • auth_statusno sensitive capability
  • build-levelno sensitive capability
  • Campaign Examplesno sensitive capability
  • challenge-levelno sensitive capability
  • check_publish_readinessno sensitive capability
  • clear_levelno sensitive capability
Show 63 more tools ↓
  • clear_regionno sensitive capability
  • create_levelno sensitive capability
  • Current Levelno sensitive capability
  • delete_draftno sensitive capability
  • delete_remote_draftno sensitive capability
  • export_levelno sensitive capability
  • fill_regionno sensitive capability
  • Game Rulesno sensitive capability
  • get_campaign_exampleno sensitive capability
  • get_game_rulesno sensitive capability
  • get_levelno sensitive capability
  • get_level_requirementsno sensitive capability
  • get_my_published_levelno sensitive capability
  • get_tile_typesno sensitive capability
  • gridSizeno sensitive capability
  • import_levelno sensitive capability
  • improve-levelno sensitive capability
  • interaction_faqno sensitive capability
  • list_campaign_examplesno sensitive capability
  • list_draftsno sensitive capability
  • list_my_published_levelsno sensitive capability
  • list_remote_draftsno sensitive capability
  • load_draftno sensitive capability
  • load_local_draftno sensitive capability
  • mechanicsno sensitive capability
  • move_tileno sensitive capability
  • place_tileno sensitive capability
  • place_tiles_batchno sensitive capability
  • preview_levelno sensitive capability
  • publish_levelno sensitive capability
  • reachable_fromno sensitive capability
  • redono sensitive capability
  • remove_barrierno sensitive capability
  • remove_pressure_plateno sensitive capability
  • remove_pushable_rockno sensitive capability
  • remove_thin_iceno sensitive capability
  • remove_tileno sensitive capability
  • remove_warpno sensitive capability
  • rename_levelno sensitive capability
  • restore_published_levelno sensitive capability
  • revert_to_last_solvableno sensitive capability
  • save_draftno sensitive capability
  • save_local_draftno sensitive capability
  • seed_layout_patternno sensitive capability
  • set_barrierno sensitive capability
  • set_goalno sensitive capability
  • set_grid_sizeno sensitive capability
  • set_parno sensitive capability
  • set_par_to_shortestno sensitive capability
  • set_pressure_plateno sensitive capability
  • set_startno sensitive capability
  • simulate_moveno sensitive capability
  • simulate_playthroughno sensitive capability
  • solve_levelno sensitive capability
  • suggest_skeleton_layoutno sensitive capability
  • suggest_stop_pointsno sensitive capability
  • targetMovesno sensitive capability
  • test_placementno sensitive capability
  • Tile Typesno sensitive capability
  • undono sensitive capability
  • unpublish_levelno sensitive capability
  • validate_quality_gateno sensitive capability
  • visualize_levelno sensitive capability

What this scan could not see

Versions 1

Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.

VersionScoreFindingsEngineScanned
v1.1.2 latest B 86/100 5 1.13.0 2026-09-07

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MCP Trust Score: B · 86/100
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