ibmcloud-mcp-server
npm
v1.0.1
Published by expertvagabond — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`dist/cli.js:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; export async function executeIBMCloud(args, options) { return new Promise((r
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/cli.js
In the server's implementation (`src/cli.ts:1`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; export interface CLIResult { success: boolean; stdout: string; stderr: st
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server src/cli.ts
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ibmcloud_account_listno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_account_showno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_apino sensitive capabilityibmcloud_billing_account_usageno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_billing_org_usageno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_billing_resource_group_usageno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_billing_resource_instances_usageno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_catalog_searchno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_catalog_serviceno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_catalog_service_plansno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_cf_appno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_cf_appsno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_cf_bind_serviceno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_cf_create_serviceno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_cf_deleteno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_cf_envno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_cf_logsno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_cf_marketplaceno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_cf_orgsno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_cf_pushno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_cf_restartno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_cf_routesno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_cf_scaleno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_cf_servicesno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_cf_set_envno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_cf_spacesno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_cf_startno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_cf_stopno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_cf_unbind_serviceno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_config_listno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_cr_image_rmno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_cr_imagesno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_cr_namespace_addno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_cr_namespacesno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_cr_quotano sensitive capabilityibmcloud_iam_access_groupno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_iam_access_group_createno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_iam_access_group_policiesno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_iam_access_group_policy_createno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_iam_access_group_user_addno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_iam_access_group_usersno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_iam_access_groupsno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_iam_api_key_createno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_iam_api_key_deleteno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_iam_api_keysno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_iam_rolesno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_iam_service_api_key_createno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_iam_service_api_keysno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_iam_service_idno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_iam_service_id_createno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_iam_service_id_deleteno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_iam_service_idsno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_iam_user_inviteno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_iam_usersno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_ks_clusterno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_ks_cluster_configno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_ks_cluster_createno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_ks_cluster_deleteno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_ks_clustersno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_ks_flavorsno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_ks_versionsno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_ks_worker_pool_createno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_ks_worker_pool_resizeno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_ks_worker_poolsno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_ks_workersno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_ks_zonesno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_loginno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_logoutno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_plugin_installno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_plugin_listno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_plugin_repo_pluginsno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_regionsno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_resource_group_createno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_resource_groupsno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_resource_searchno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_resource_service_instanceno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_resource_service_instance_createno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_resource_service_instance_deleteno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_resource_service_instance_updateno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_resource_service_instancesno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_resource_service_keyno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_resource_service_key_createno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_resource_service_key_deleteno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_resource_service_keysno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_resource_tag_attachno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_resource_tagsno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_targetno sensitive capabilityibmcloud_versionno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.1 latest |
A 93/100 | 2 | 1.9.0 | 2026-07-23 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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