Mcpbridge MCP Server
@iamjrmh/mcpbridge
npm
v1.0.0
Published by @iamjrmh — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 4
high Tool "studio_create_script" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "studio_create_script" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (parameter "script"). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool studio_create_script
high Shell/command execution in server code (index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`index.js:693`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: eprecated APIs (wait(), spawn(), delay()) - Include brief inline comments for non-obvious logic - Respond with ONLY the
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server index.js
medium Unconstrained command parameter "script_type" on "studio_create_script"MTC-CAP-006
Tool "studio_create_script" takes a command-shaped parameter "script_type" with no enum/pattern constraint. Free-form, model- or attacker-controlled arguments reaching a shell is the command-injection precondition.
Fix: Constrain the parameter (enum/pattern), or build the command from a fixed template with escaped args.
Location: tool studio_create_script · inputSchema.properties.script_type
low Mutating tool "studio_create_script" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "studio_create_script" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool studio_create_script
Tools 33
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
studio_create_scriptruns code / shellBlender connection statusno sensitive capabilityBlender output logno sensitive capabilityblender_build_sceneno sensitive capabilityblender_execute_pythonno sensitive capabilityblender_get_outputno sensitive capabilityblender_get_scene_infono sensitive capabilityblender_statusno sensitive capabilitydescriptionno sensitive capabilityfeatureno sensitive capability
Show 23 more tools ↓
focusno sensitive capabilitylocationno sensitive capabilityMCPBridge agent skill guideno sensitive capabilityMCPBridge server infono sensitive capabilityollama_generateno sensitive capabilityollama_generate_luano sensitive capabilityollama_generate_pythonno sensitive capabilityollama_review_scriptno sensitive capabilityRoblox Studio connection statusno sensitive capabilityRoblox Studio output logno sensitive capabilityroblox_build_featureno sensitive capabilityroblox_debug_scriptno sensitive capabilityroblox_review_scriptno sensitive capabilityscript_pathno sensitive capabilitystudio_execute_luano sensitive capabilitystudio_get_outputno sensitive capabilitystudio_get_selectionno sensitive capabilitystudio_get_workspace_infono sensitive capabilitystudio_list_scriptsno sensitive capabilitystudio_read_scriptno sensitive capabilitystudio_statusno sensitive capabilitystudio_write_scriptno sensitive capabilitysymptomno sensitive capability
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (33 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v1.0.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 4 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-25 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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