@iamjameslennon/ddb-mcp
npm
v2.10.2
Source verified
Published by iamjameslennon — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
D&D Beyond MCP Server with Google Auth
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 6 = 94. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
In the server's implementation (`dist/browser.js:3`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { createRequire } from "module"; import { dirname, join } from "path"; im
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/browser.js
In the server's implementation (`dist/tools/monster.js:366`): A hardcoded outbound call to a fixed external host inside server code is a classic exfiltration/telemetry channel — especially paired with reads of local data. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: const resp = await fetch(`https://api.open5e.com/v1/monsters/?name=${encodeURIComponent(name)}&limit=5`, { headers:
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/tools/monster.js
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
ddb_close_browseringests untrusted inputddb_download_characteringests untrusted inputddb_get_pageingests untrusted inputddb_character_lookupno sensitive capabilityddb_clear_cacheno sensitive capabilityddb_encounter_crno sensitive capabilityddb_get_campaignno sensitive capabilityddb_get_characterno sensitive capabilityddb_get_character_rawno sensitive capabilityddb_get_conditionno sensitive capabilityddb_get_equipmentno sensitive capabilityddb_get_monsterno sensitive capabilityddb_get_partyno sensitive capabilityddb_get_rulesno sensitive capabilityddb_get_spellno sensitive capabilityddb_interactno sensitive capabilityddb_list_campaignsno sensitive capabilityddb_list_charactersno sensitive capabilityddb_list_libraryno sensitive capabilityddb_loginno sensitive capabilityddb_navigateno sensitive capabilityddb_rate_encounterno sensitive capabilityddb_read_bookno sensitive capabilityddb_roll_treasureno sensitive capabilityddb_search_backgroundsno sensitive capabilityddb_search_class_featuresno sensitive capabilityddb_search_classesno sensitive capabilityddb_search_equipmentno sensitive capabilityddb_search_featsno sensitive capabilityddb_search_monstersno sensitive capabilityddb_search_racesno sensitive capabilityddb_search_racial_traitsno sensitive capabilityddb_search_rulesno sensitive capabilityddb_search_siteno sensitive capabilityddb_search_spellsno sensitive capabilityScan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v2.10.2 latest |
A 94/100 | 2 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-08 |
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
npx mcptrustchecker scan @iamjameslennon/ddb-mcp --online
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