Q Ring MCP Server
@i4ctime/q-ring
npm
v0.16.2
Source verified
Published by i4ctime — publish provenance cryptographically ties this package to that repository. That is proof of origin, not an official vendor package.
Quantum keyring for AI coding tools — Cursor, Kiro, Claude Code. Secrets, superposition, entanglement, MCP.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 6.3 = 94. What the published surface and source actually contain:
| Points | What was found | Category |
|---|---|---|
| −6.3 | Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink MTC-SRC-009 | injection |
2. Client adoption risk — 94 − 6 = 88. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 8
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([get_secret, list_secrets]) and tools that can send data out ([exec_with_secrets]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [get_secret, list_secrets] → sinks [exec_with_secrets]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow get_secret → exec_with_secrets
high Tool "exec_with_secrets" exposes command/code executionMTC-CAP-001
Tool "exec_with_secrets" appears to run shell commands or evaluate code (keyword "exec" in tool name). Arbitrary execution driven by model input is one of the most dangerous MCP capabilities; combined with any untrusted input it becomes RCE.
Fix: Sandbox execution, allowlist commands/arguments, and never pass model output to a shell unescaped.
Location: tool exec_with_secrets
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-KFILBHOY.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-KFILBHOY.js:183`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { readFileSync as readFileSync2, statSync } from "fs"; import { join as j
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-KFILBHOY.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/chunk-SQKTDYSO.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/chunk-SQKTDYSO.js:183`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: port { execSync } from "child_process"; import { readFileSync as readFileSync2, statSync } from "fs"; import { join as j
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/chunk-SQKTDYSO.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:1975`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { StringDecoder } from "string_decoder"; import { Transform } from "strea
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
high Shell/command execution in server code (dist/mcp.js)MTC-SRC-002
In the server's implementation (`dist/mcp.js:2142`): Spawning a shell/process is command-execution capability; with unsanitized tool input it is command injection / RCE. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: import { spawn } from "child_process"; import { StringDecoder } from "string_decoder"; import { Transform } from "strea
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/mcp.js
medium Untrusted input concatenated into a command sink (dist/index.js)MTC-SRC-009
In the server's implementation (`dist/index.js:2615`): A shell/process command assembled from concatenated or interpolated values is command injection when any part is attacker-influenced — the OWASP canonical RCE flow. Verify what reaches the interpolated value. This is read from the code itself — not from the tool description — so a poisoned server cannot hide it behind honest-looking metadata.
Evidence: rt" : "xdg-open"; exec(`${openCmd} ${url}`); } const shutdown = () => { console.log(` ${c.dim(" das
Fix: Review this call path: confirm it never receives unsanitized tool input, constrain it, or remove it. Treat a server whose code reaches these sinks as high-capability regardless of what its tools claim.
Location: server dist/index.js
low Mutating tool "exec_with_secrets" declares no destructiveHintMTC-CAP-005
Tool "exec_with_secrets" can mutate/egress but declares no destructiveHint. Clients that don't default to spec-safe behavior may not prompt before running it.
Fix: Declare accurate annotations, and gate destructive tools on user confirmation regardless.
Location: tool exec_with_secrets
Tools 57
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
exec_with_secretsruns code / shellget_secretreads sensitive datalist_secretsreads sensitive dataagent_forgetno sensitive capabilityagent_recallno sensitive capabilityagent_rememberno sensitive capabilityagent_scanno sensitive capabilityanalyze_secretsno sensitive capabilityanthropicno sensitive capabilityaudit_logno sensitive capability
Show 47 more tools ↓
awsno sensitive capabilitycheck_policyno sensitive capabilitycheck_projectno sensitive capabilityci_validate_secretsno sensitive capabilitydelete_secretno sensitive capabilitydetect_anomaliesno sensitive capabilitydetect_environmentno sensitive capabilitydisentangle_secretsno sensitive capabilityelevenlabsno sensitive capabilityentangle_secretsno sensitive capabilityenv_generateno sensitive capabilityexport_auditno sensitive capabilityexport_secretsno sensitive capabilitygenerate_secretno sensitive capabilitygenericno sensitive capabilityget_policy_summaryno sensitive capabilityget_project_contextno sensitive capabilitygithubno sensitive capabilitygoogle-aino sensitive capabilitygroqno sensitive capabilityhas_secretno sensitive capabilityhealth_checkno sensitive capabilityhttpno sensitive capabilityhuggingfaceno sensitive capabilityimport_dotenvno sensitive capabilityinspect_secretno sensitive capabilitylint_filesno sensitive capabilitylist_hooksno sensitive capabilitylist_providersno sensitive capabilityopenaino sensitive capabilityopenrouterno sensitive capabilityregister_hookno sensitive capabilityremove_hookno sensitive capabilityrotate_secretno sensitive capabilityscan_codebase_for_secretsno sensitive capabilityset_secretno sensitive capabilitystatus_dashboardno sensitive capabilitystripeno sensitive capabilityteleport_packno sensitive capabilityteleport_unpackno sensitive capabilitytunnel_createno sensitive capabilitytunnel_destroyno sensitive capabilitytunnel_listno sensitive capabilitytunnel_readno sensitive capabilityvalidate_secretno sensitive capabilityvercelno sensitive capabilityverify_audit_chainno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 1
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (57 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 6
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.16.2 latest |
B 88/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
v0.16.1 |
B 88/100 | 8 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-01 |
v0.15.0 |
B 88/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-16 |
v0.14.1 |
B 88/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-05 |
v0.13.1 |
B 88/100 | 8 | 1.12.1 | 2026-08-03 |
Show 1 more version ↓
v0.13.0 |
B 88/100 | 8 | 1.10.0 | 2026-07-27 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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