A2amarket MCP Server
@hz-abyssal-heart/a2amarket-mcp-server
npm
v0.4.0
Published by @hz-abyssal-heart — no publish provenance, so origin is unverified, but the source is public: the repository link below is self-declared yet readable, so you can inspect the code before adopting it.
A2A Market MCP Server — Connect AI agents to A2A Market via Model Context Protocol. 51 MCP Tools covering sourcing, negotiation, settlement, and notification.
The grade answers one question — how safe is this server for you to adopt — so it is computed in two auditable stages. Nothing below is an opinion or an LLM's guess; every line is a real term the deterministic engine applied, and the same input always yields the same number.
1. Threat score — 100 − 0 = 100. What the published surface and source actually contain:
The deterministic scan raised no scored threat in the surface it inspected — the threat score stayed at 100. Capability observations and advisory notes are recorded but never lower it.
2. Client adoption risk — 100 − 7 = 93. Three small, subtract-only factors that reflect your risk in adopting it — a clean scan proves less on a powerful, unverified or barely-inspectable package, so the grade says so plainly:
| Points | Adoption-risk factor |
|---|---|
| −6 | capability blast radius (high) — client exposure if the model is manipulated |
| −1 | publisher verification (public source) — no provenance, but the source is public and inspectable |
Capability observations and info notes are shown under Findings but never scored.
Open any row's finding below for the file, line and evidence behind a deduction.
Findings 6
high Read-and-egress in one tool: "register_agent"MTC-FLOW-003
Tool "register_agent" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.
Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.
Location: flow register_agent
high Read-and-egress in one tool: "update_agent"MTC-FLOW-003
Tool "update_agent" can both read sensitive data and send data to an external destination. Even without an explicit untrusted-input leg, this is a single-call data-exfiltration path if the model is ever manipulated.
Fix: Separate reading from sending; require explicit user confirmation before egress of file/secret contents.
Location: flow update_agent
high Sensitive-source and external-sink co-existMTC-FLOW-004
Tools that read sensitive data ([register_agent, update_agent]) and tools that can send data out ([register_agent, send_message, update_agent]) are exposed together. An agent can move private data to the sink.
Evidence: sources [register_agent, update_agent] → sinks [register_agent, send_message, update_agent]
Fix: Keep secret-reading and egress capabilities on separate, separately-approved servers.
Location: flow register_agent → send_message
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "endpoint_url" on "register_agent"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "register_agent" takes a URL/host parameter "endpoint_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool register_agent · inputSchema.properties.endpoint_url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "webhook_url" on "register_agent"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "register_agent" takes a URL/host parameter "webhook_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool register_agent · inputSchema.properties.webhook_url
medium Unconstrained URL/host parameter "webhook_url" on "update_agent"MTC-CAP-007
Tool "update_agent" takes a URL/host parameter "webhook_url" with no allowlist/pattern. An outbound-request tool with an unbounded destination enables SSRF and cloud-metadata access (e.g. 169.254.169.254).
Fix: Allowlist destinations or constrain the parameter; block private/link-local addresses server-side.
Location: tool update_agent · inputSchema.properties.webhook_url
Tools 51
Each tool and what it can reach — statically extracted from the published source.
register_agentnetwork egressreads sensitive dataupdate_agentnetwork egressreads sensitive datasend_messagenetwork egressaccept_dealno sensitive capabilityauthorize_dealno sensitive capabilitycancel_intentno sensitive capabilitycheck_handleno sensitive capabilitycheck_reputationno sensitive capabilitycreate_settlementno sensitive capabilitydeclare_supplyno sensitive capability
Show 41 more tools ↓
delete_hosted_strategyno sensitive capabilitydelete_supply_productno sensitive capabilityget_balanceno sensitive capabilityget_conversationno sensitive capabilityget_incoming_intentsno sensitive capabilityget_intent_statusno sensitive capabilityget_messagesno sensitive capabilityget_my_agentsno sensitive capabilityget_negotiation_roundsno sensitive capabilityget_negotiation_statusno sensitive capabilityget_notificationsno sensitive capabilityget_order_statusno sensitive capabilityget_preferencesno sensitive capabilityget_profileno sensitive capabilityget_reputationno sensitive capabilityget_sourcing_statusno sensitive capabilityget_supply_productno sensitive capabilityget_usageno sensitive capabilitylist_api_keysno sensitive capabilitylist_conversationsno sensitive capabilitylist_hosted_strategiesno sensitive capabilitylist_matchesno sensitive capabilitylist_responsesno sensitive capabilitylist_subscriptionsno sensitive capabilitylist_supply_productsno sensitive capabilitymark_all_notifications_readno sensitive capabilitymark_notification_readno sensitive capabilitypublish_intentno sensitive capabilityreject_dealno sensitive capabilityrespond_to_intentno sensitive capabilityrotate_api_keyno sensitive capabilitysearch_agentsno sensitive capabilityselect_and_negotiateno sensitive capabilityset_hosted_strategyno sensitive capabilityset_preferencesno sensitive capabilitysubmit_offerno sensitive capabilitysubscribe_intentno sensitive capabilityunsubscribe_intentno sensitive capabilityupdate_profileno sensitive capabilityupdate_supplyno sensitive capabilityverify_emailno sensitive capability
Toxic flows 3
Cross-tool combinations that form a data-exfiltration primitive (untrusted input → sensitive source → external sink).
What this scan could not see
- Tools were statically extracted from the published source (51 recovered), not enumerated from a running server. Tool-poisoning, Unicode-smuggling, capability and toxic-flow analysis ran on this inferred surface, but a mis-parsed registration could be missed or mis-attributed, so tool-derived findings are capped below “confirmed”. To grade the real runtime surface, scan the running server: --command "npx -y <package>".
Versions 1
Scan history per published version. The engine is deterministic — the same version always yields the same score, so a changed score means the package itself changed.
| Version | Score | Findings | Engine | Scanned |
|---|---|---|---|---|
v0.4.0 latest |
A 93/100 | 6 | 1.13.0 | 2026-09-07 |
Embed this score
Show this server's live Trust Score in your README, docs or website. The badge is served straight from the registry and updates automatically after every rescan — no API key needed. It links back to this page, so anyone who sees the grade can also read the findings behind it instead of taking a number on faith.
Verify this score yourself
The score above is reproducible: the same package version always yields the same result. Run it locally or over the free API — no account, no LLM, fully deterministic.
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